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Summary 
The area of VAT constitutes a completely harmonized area within the EU 
and the national provisions in this area are to their entirety based on EU law. 
A uniform application of the VAT provisions throughout the EU therefore 
becomes essential in order to ensure the proper function of the VAT system. 
The obligation for national courts to interpret national law in conformity 
with EU law becomes an important tool to ensure the uniform application 
and the effectiveness of EU law in every Member state. The obligation to 
interpret national law in conformity with EU law is absolute and can only be 
limited under exceptional circumstances. National courts always need to 
observe this obligation when interpreting provisions of national law.   
 
In the area of VAT, the matter of exemptions has been subject to many 
discussions ever since they were introduced in the Sixth directive, especially 
the exemption regarding financial services. The uncertainty of the 
interpretation and application of the exemption has been the subject to many 
questions posed to the ECJ to clarify. This uncertainty has in turn affected 
the uniform application of the exemption throughout the EU.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the concept of consistent 
interpretation regarding the financial service exemption in VAT and to 
examine if the Swedish interpretation of this exemption is in conformity 
with EU law. In order to achieve its objective, the thesis commences by 
examining the interpretation of the financial service exemption stated in 
article 135(1)(b)-(g) in the VAT directive. This implies an analysis of the 
ECJ case law. The thesis continues by examining the interpretation of the 
corresponding exemption provision in chapter 3 paragraph 9 in the Swedish 
VAT Act and its interpretation by the HFD. The thesis highlights the 
influence the interpretation of article 135(1)(b)-(g) has had on the 
interpretation of chapter 3 paragraph 9 of the VAT Act and what limits the 
obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law.  
 
The thesis finds that the ECJ has been inclined to interpret the financial 
service exemption extensively and not according to the general principle of 
strict interpretation regarding exemptions. Moreover, the thesis finds that 
the interpretation of the Swedish exemption provision is in conformity with 
EU law in the sense that the interpretation of the HFD follows the case law 
of the ECJ. It is clear that the interpretation of the ECJ greatly influenced 
the interpretation of the HFD. In addition, the accession of Sweden into the 
EU has changed the Swedish interpretation of the exemption to be more 
extensive than before.  
 
Furthermore, since the general principles of EU law limits the obligation of 
consistent interpretation, the degree of harmonization in the VAT area 
effects this limitation. Basically, as long as the interpretation of the ECJ 
does not contradict the treaties and their general principles, the obligation to 
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interpret national law in conformity with EU law is not limited for national 
courts.               
 3 
Sammanfattning 
Mervärdeskatterätten utgör ett fullständigt harmoniserat område inom EU 
och medlemsstaternas lagstiftning på området är till sin helhet baserad på 
EU rätten. En uniform tillämpning av momsreglerna i medlemsstaterna är av 
stor vikt för mervärdesskattesystemets funktion. Skyldigheten att tolka 
nationell lag i enlighet med EU rätten är därför ett viktigt instrument för att 
säkerställa en uniform tillämning samt att EU rätten får avsedd effekt i varje 
medlemsstat.  
 
På mervärdesskatteområdet har undantagen från mervärdesskatt varit 
föremål för mycket diskussion i och med deras införande i Sjätte 
mervärdesskattedirektivet, i synnerhet undantaget för finansiella tjänster. 
Undantagets omfattning och tillämpning har framstått som oklar och EU-
domstolen har i flera fall ställts inför frågor rörande tolkningen av detta 
undantag. Denna oklarhet har inverkat på den uniforma tillämpningen av 
undantaget inom EU:s medlemsstater. Att tolka undantaget för finansiella 
tjänster EU konformt är således av stor vikt för att säkerställa en likartad 
tillämpning inom hela EU. Skyldigheten att tolka nationell rätt EU konformt 
är absolut och begränsas endast i exceptionella fall. De nationella 
domstolarna kan inte bortse från denna skyldighet i tolkningen och 
tillämpningen av den nationella lagstiftningen.        
 
Denna framställnings syfte är att analysera konceptet EU konform tolkning 
rörande undantaget för finansiella tjänster ur ett svenskt perspektiv och 
huruvida Sverige uppfyller skyldigheten att tolka lagstiftningen EU 
konformt rörande motsvarande undantagsregel i ML. För att uppnå syftet 
med framställningen tar den sin utgångspunkt i fastställandet av EU rätten, 
vilket innebär en genomgång av hur undantaget för finansiella tjänster i 
artikel 135.1 b-g i mervärdesskattedirektivet har tolkats av EU-domstolen. 
Därefter följer en likartad genomgång av 3:9 i ML och hur denna 
bestämmelse har tolkats av HFD. I framställningen belyses den effekt som 
tolkningen av undantaget i direktivet har haft på tolkningen av den svenska 
bestämmelsen samt i vilken mån skyldigheten att tolka EU konformt 
begränsas.        
 
Det kan konstateras att EU-domstolen inte har varit benägen att tillämpa den 
generella principen om restriktiv tolkning av undantag och valt att tolka 
undantaget för finansiella tjänster mycket extensivt. Den svenska tolkningen 
av undantaget kan anses vara EU konform i den meningen att HFD:s 
tolkning följer EU-domstolens praxis. Det framstår också som klart att den 
svenska tolkningen till stor del har influerats av motsvarande tolkning av 
EU-domstolen rörande direktivet. Sveriges inträde i EU har förändrat HFD:s 
tolkning av undantaget till att vara betydligt mer extensiv i enlighet med hur 
undantaget har tolkats av EU-domstolen. Vidare gäller att effekten av den 
genomharmoniserade karaktären hos mervärdesskatteområdet får särskilt 
stor betydelse i förhållande till begräsningen av skyldigheten att tolka EU 
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konformt. Så länge EU-domstolens tolkning inte strider mot fördragen är 
skyldigheten att tolka EU konformt ej begränsad för nationella domstolar.   
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Abbreviations 
AG  Advocate General 
 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
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HFD  Swedish Supreme Administrative Court 
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TEU Treaty on European Union 
 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
At the outset, it is important to bear in mind the character of the legal 
system such as the one in the EU and the correlation of the system with the 
legal systems of the Member states. The ECJ has established the basic 
principle of the primacy of EU law. According to this principle, EU law 
provisions are on top of the norm hierarchy and cannot be overridden by 
national legislation.1 Consequently, in the harmonised areas, national 
provisions are under the influence of EU law and its principles that entails 
certain obligations with which national courts need to comply. The 
application of EU law throughout the EU is hinged on cooperation between 
the ECJ and the national courts.2 An expression of this cooperative 
relationship can be derived from the treaties.3 
 
Furthermore, in applying the provisions of national law, in particular the 
provisions implementing a directive, national courts must interpret such 
laws in light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of article 288 TFEU.4 
The obligation to interpret the law in such manner has been described as 
interpretation in conformity with EU law.5  
 
This thesis sets out to examine the obligation for national courts to interpret 
national law in conformity with EU law regarding the VAT exemption for 
financial services. VAT in the European Union is defined as a general tax on 
consumption that should be levied on all goods and services. Exemptions 
from VAT constitute derogations from this principle and a harmonized 
application of these exemptions throughout the EU therefore becomes of 
great importance in order to achieve a uniform VAT system. The obligation 
to interpret national law in conformity with EU law is therefore meant to 
ensure that the objectives of EU law are enforced in all Member states. 
 
The area of VAT constitutes a complete harmonized area within the EU 
where national provisions are entirely based on the sources of EU law.6 
Apart from the treaties, the sources of law mainly consist of the VAT 
directive and the case law of the ECJ. The obligations and principles derived 
                                                
1 Judgment in Costa v. ENEL, C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66. 
2 R.F. van Brederode, R. Krever (eds), Legal Interpretation of Tax Law (2014), p. 112. 
3 Article 267 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
union [2012] OJ C326/47. Hereinafter the ‘TFEU’. 
4 Judgment in Von Colson and Kamann, C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153, para. 26. This was later 
confirmed in Marleasing, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:4135.  
5 O. Henkow, Mervärdesskatt i teori och tillämpning (2013), p. 15. 
6 Article 113 of the TFEU. See also B. Terra, J. Kajus, Introduction to European VAT 
(Recast) (2015), p. 7.   
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from the VAT directive7, the treaties and the ECJ case law, therefore 
becomes relevant to observe for the Member states in matters regarding 
VAT and when applying their VAT provisions within their national legal 
order.  
 
The matter of exemptions in the field of VAT has been subject to a lot of 
discussions over the past decades. The Sixth Directive showed the 
introduction of the current exemptions in the VAT area.8 One of the main 
purposes of the Sixth Directive was to present a common list of the 
exemptions to be applied in the Community.9 However, the main idea was 
always to keep the exemptions as small as possible in order to ensure that 
VAT was still a general tax on consumption.10 Nevertheless, even though 
the intention was to keep the exemptions to the minimum, the scope of the 
introduced exemptions was flexible, much due to the political and economic 
dimension in each Member State.11  
 
The financial service exemption is an area that has spurred many questions 
over the years. When introduced in the Sixth directive, the scope and the 
application of the exemption was very unclear and thus provided for an 
indistinct application of the exemption throughout the EU. In the end, this 
discrepancy affected the legal certainty of the provision.12 The significant 
amount of case law from the ECJ in this area confirms this uncertainty. 
Given the uncertain nature of the financial service exemption in EU law, an 
indistinct interpretation of these exemptions in the Members states thus 
becomes imminent. From the start, the scope of the exemption has been 
consistently developed in the legislation, but more importantly in the case 
law of the ECJ. It can be argued whether the ECJ actually has provided 
clarity in this matter or not. Nevertheless, the development of the financial 
service exemption has highlighted certain issues of the interpretation and 
application of the financial service exemption within the legal orders of the 
Members states. In light of these developments, the interpretational 
approach of the national courts regarding this exemption becomes of interest 
to examine as well as if and how the national courts have adapted to these 
developments in order to comply with their obligation to interpret national 
law in conformity with EU law.  
                                                
7 Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, OJ L 347/1. 
Hereinafter “VAT Directive”.  
8 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value-added tax: uniform 
basis of assessment, OJ L 145/1. Hereinafter “Sixth Directive”. 
9 B. Terra, J. Kajus, Commentary – A Guide to the Sixth VAT Directive (Historical Archive) 
(2010), p. 2215.   
10 The preamble for the Proposal of a Sixth Directive, COM(73) 950, p. 7. 
11 B. Terra, J. Kajus (2010), p. 2215; C. Amand, Are VAT Exemptions Compatible with 
Primary EU Law? (2010), p. 410.    
12 M. Lamensch, Commission proposal for a Modernization of VAT Rules that are applied 
in respect of financial and insurance services, (2008), p. 371; C. Amand (2010), p. 410.  
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1.2 Objective and research questions 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the Swedish interpretation of the 
VAT exemption regarding financial services and if this interpretation is in 
conformity with EU law. To achieve this objective, the thesis will examine 
how the exemption for financial services in the VAT directive is interpreted 
by the ECJ and how the corresponding exemption provision in the Swedish 
VAT Act13 is interpreted by the HFD. In detail, the thesis will highlight the 
interaction between EU law and Swedish national law and the limitations to 
this interaction. In relation to this, the thesis will also examine how the 
interpretational power of the ECJ has influenced the developments of the 
scope of financial service exemption and if these developments has effected 
the interpretation of the HFD regarding the exemption.   
 
The thesis will seek to answer the following questions in order to fulfil its 
objective:  
• How are the EU VAT provision regarding financial services 
interpreted in EU law and in what way has this interpretation 
affected the uncertainty of the scope? 
• How is the Swedish VAT exemption provision regarding financial 
services interpreted in national law and has the development in EU 
law effected the Swedish interpretation of the provision?  
• What is an interpretation in conformity with EU law? 
• Is the Swedish interpretation of the financial service exemption 
interpreted in conformity with EU law?  
• What limitations are there to this interpretation?      
 
The thesis could therefore be seen as divided into two parts. First, the 
interpretation of the provisions, both in the VAT directive and in the 
Swedish VAT Act, will be examined as well as how the developments of 
the scope of the provisions in the VAT directive has impacted the 
interpretational approach of the Swedish provisions. Second, the thesis 
seeks to examine the concept of consistent interpretation regarding the VAT 
exemption dealing with financial services and if this interpretation is 
manifested in the Swedish interpretation of its national provisions. Thus, the 
purpose of the thesis is descriptive in nature and seeks to establish how the 
law is applied, i.e the law as it is.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 Mervärdesskattelagen (SFS 1994:200). 
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1.3 Methodology 
In order to achieve its objective, the thesis applies the legal dogmatic 
method by examining the relevant sources of law. The purpose of the 
dogmatic method is to examine and present the law as it is, in order to 
address a legal issue.14 Even though the purpose of this thesis is descriptive 
in nature, it does not preclude the usage of the dogmatic method. 
Interpreting and establishing the law as it is, is only one of the perspectives 
contained within this method.15  
 
When applying the method, the sources of law are examined according to 
their status as legal norms.16 In this instance, the thesis deals with a 
harmonized area within the EU, the starting point of the research therefore 
becomes the sources of EU law. These sources of law ranges from the 
primary law to the secondary law followed by the case law of the ECJ.17 
Thereafter, the national provisions are examined starting with the legal 
provisions and the preparatory works and then continuing with the case law 
of the HFD.18    
 
The focus of this thesis is to examine how the law is applied in both 
Swedish and the European legal order. This implies an examination of the 
case law of the ECJ and the HFD respectively. However, in order to 
establish the potential discrepancies between the two legal orders, the thesis 
starts with establishing the law as it is according to each legal order.  
 
1.4 Structure 
The thesis is thematically structured. It describes the concept of consistent 
interpretation and the interpretation of the VAT exemption provision, both 
in the directive and in Swedish national law in separate chapters. Each 
chapter is aimed at answering one research question and the content of the 
chapters is arranged as to commence with providing a general overview 
before continuing with dealing with the matters and questions in depth. 
 
After an introduction to the thesis in the first chapter, the second chapter 
discusses the concept of directive implementation into national law. 
Moreover, it provides for an examination of the concept of consistent 
interpretation and its application in national law. 
 
                                                
14 L. Olsen, Rättsvetenskapliga perspektiv (2004), p. 112; F. Korling and M. Zamboni, 
Juridisk Metodlära (2013), p. 21, 23. 
15 L. Olsen (2004), p. 119 and forward; F. Korling and M. Zamboni (2013), p. 35. 
16 C. Dahlman, Rätt och rättfärdigande (2010), p. 21 and forward. 
17 J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson, EU-rättslig metod – Teori och genomslag i svensk 
rättstillämpning (2012), p. 40. 
18 C. Dahlman (2010), p. 24. 
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The third chapter examines the methods of interpretation used by the ECJ 
when interpreting EU law provisions. The chapter continues by examining 
how these methods apply in relation to one another. 
 
The fourth chapter deals with the exemption provision for financial services 
in the VAT directive and examines the case law of the ECJ regarding the 
financial service exemption. The purpose is to give a description of how this 
exemption is interpreted and how the case law has developed the scope of 
the exemption. In addition, the goal is also to show how the interpretation of 
the VAT exemptions is conducted by the ECJ, in light of what has been 
dealt with in the preceding third chapter.  
 
With a similar character as the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter examines the 
financial service exemption provision in the Swedish VAT Act and how the 
exemption provision is interpreted by the HFD. In this chapter, emphasis is 
put on the correlation between the Swedish and European interpretational 
approaches. In addition, examples of the practical application of consistent 
interpretation in the Swedish practice will be dealt with in this chapter.  
 
The sixth chapter provides some concluding remarks on the findings and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the conducted analysis of the previous 
chapters. In order to provide for a pedagogical overview of the conclusions 
of this thesis the final chapter is divided into three sections, one dealing with 
EU law, one dealing with Swedish law and the third dealing with the 
concept of consistent interpretation. 
    
1.5 Terminology and delimitations  
The obligation to interpret national law in the light of EU law has been 
referred to by the ECJ as the obligation to interpret national law “in 
conformity with EU law”.19 The literature features this expression as well.20  
However, in the doctrine, various expressions have been used in reference to 
the obligation as a concept. For example, Ben Terra refers to the obligation 
with the term “reconciliatory interpretation”.21 Sacha Prechal uses the 
expression “consistent interpretation”22, which also seems to be an 
expression somewhat consistent in the literature.23 Therefore, the thesis uses 
the expression of the ECJ when referring to the obligation itself and the term 
“consistent interpretation” throughout the thesis in reference to the actual 
concept.        
                                                
19 See for ex. Judgments in Von Colson and Kamann, C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153 and 
Marleasing, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:4135. 
20 O. Henkow (2013), p. 15; R.F. van Brederode, R. Krever (eds) (2014), p. 125; N. 
Wittock, The influence of the Principle of Union Loyalty in Tax Matters, (2014), p. 174.   
21 See B. Terra, J. Kajus, Introduction to European VAT (Recast) (2015), p. 141. 
22 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, (2005), p. 180 and forward. 
23 G. Betlem, A. Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public International Law and European 
Community Law before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of 
Consistent Interpretation, (2003), p. 572. 
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For the purpose of this thesis, only the literal, contextual and teleological 
interpretation will be focused on the most and therefore the historical 
method of interpretation will only be touched upon briefly. In addition, the 
thesis only focuses on the interpretation of EU law as practised by the ECJ.  
 
Since the purpose of the thesis is to examine the interpretation of the 
financial service exemption in both the directive and in the VAT Act this 
will require an examination of the case law of both the ECJ and the HFD. In 
this case, it is important to make a distinction. The examination of the 
interpretation inevitably requires an examination of the scope of these 
provisions. However, the thesis will not set out to define the scope of the 
financial service exemption. An actual definition of the scope of the 
financial service exemption is a subject of its own and will be too big of a 
subject to include in this thesis.   
 
The analysis of case law of the ECJ concerning the financial service 
exemption will start from the year 1995, with the case SDC. A full coverage 
of the case law regarding financial services will be to difficult to achieve. 
Chapter 4 will therefore focus on the cases that have had a big impact on the 
interpretation and application of the financial service exemption. 
 
The same principle applies to the fifth chapter, where focus is on the cases 
from the HFD that have been decisive for the determination of the 
interpretational approach of the HFD regarding the exemption.  
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2 Interpretation in conformity 
with EU Law 
2.1 Directive implementation into national 
law 
Before going into how the interpretation of national law needs to take into 
account EU law, it is necessary to explain the Member states obligation to 
implement a directive into national law. The European directives are 
binding for each Member state as to its result to be achieved and article 288 
of the TFEU states an obligation for each Member state to implement EU 
directives into their national legislation. The implementation of EU 
directives into national law also follows from the general EU principle of 
union loyalty, stated in article 4 paragraph 3 of the TEU.24 According to this 
principle, in order to ensure that the goal of the directive is achieved it is not 
only important to implement the directive correctly but also ensure that 
national law is applied according to the same. This means that the Member 
states must ensure that there are no provisions in national law that are in 
conflict with the purpose and goal of the directive that is to be implemented 
and must use the necessary means to implement the directive to achieve its 
result.25  
 
2.2 Interpretation in conformity with EU 
directives     
The matter of maintaining the objectives of EU law is not solely a task for 
the institutions of the EU but also a matter for the institutions of the 
Member states. The objectives and the purpose of the acts of the EU cannot 
be effectively upheld throughout the EU if not those objectives and purposes 
are also upheld within the Member states. For this purpose, the ECJ has 
established the primacy of EU law over national provisions.26 Where 
implementing a directive creates national provisions, the application of 
these national provisions in the national legal order is still subject to the 
influence of EU law and its general principles enshrined in the treaties. The 
reason for this is in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law in the 
national legal order.27 This has been expressed by the ECJ as well. In a 
                                                
24 The principle of Union loyalty is also referred to as the principle of sincere cooperation. 
See B. Terra, J. Kajus (2015), p. 141. 
25 This follows from article 4 paragraph 3 TEU. See also J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson (2012), p. 
179.  
26 See N. Wittock (2014), p. 171 with reference to the judgment in Costa v. ENEL, C-6/64, 
EU:C:1964:66. 
27 J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson (2012), p. 182. See also judgment in Pfeiffer and others, C-
397/01, EU:C:2004:584, para. 114.   
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judgment concerning VAT, the ECJ has held that although the Member 
states has been given a wide discretionary power in the framework of VAT 
exemptions, the Members states must refrain from taking measures that can 
jeopardize the attainment of the result prescribed by the directive and not 
undermine the purpose of the exemptions. 28 
 
Even though the binding feature of a directive is its result this still invokes 
an obligation for the Member states to interpret and apply their national 
provisions introduced due to a directive in the light of EU law. The reason 
for this is in order to achieve a uniform application of EU law throughout 
the EU. This obligation extends to all the institutions of a Member state and 
is referred to as the indirect effect of the directives, and consistent 
interpretation.29 There is an important distinction to be made in this regard. 
The indirect effect is a separate notion than the direct effect of the 
directives. When referring to the direct effect the national court applies the 
provision of the directive as an independent basis of its decision while the 
indirect effect refers to an application of a national provision in light of EU 
law. This ensures the effect of the directive through the national provision 
and thus applying its indirect effect.30   
 
As mentioned above the obligation to interpret national provisions in light 
of EU law is derived from the treaties but is also further expressed in the 
case law of the ECJ. The ECJ has stated in the case von Colson and Kamann 
that the obligation to achieve the result of a directive is binding on all the 
institutions of the Member states including the national courts. In applying 
national provisions that are introduced to implement a directive, national 
law must be interpreted in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive.31 In latter cases, the ECJ has further stated that this obligation also 
extends to national law adopted before the directive.32 In addition, the 
obligation can be regarded as autonomous in some ways since the ECJ has 
also stated that national courts always must presume that the state intended 
to entirely fulfil its obligation that arises from the directive concerned.33 
Thus, it is of little importance if the state has implemented a directive 
correctly into its national law or not. National courts are still obliged to 
interpret the national provisions in the light of the wording and purpose of 
the directive.34   
 
However, even though the obligation of consistent interpretation is 
extensive it is not without restrictions. The ECJ stated in the Marleasing 
case that the national court must interpret national law as far as possible in 
                                                
28 See for ex. judgment in Royscott and Others, C-305/97, EU:C:1999:481 and Leo Liberia, 
C-58/09, EU:C:2010:333. See also N. Wittock (2014), p. 174. 
29 S. Prechal (2005), p. 194; A-M. Vlaicu, Effectiveness of EU Law in Member States, 
(2011), p. 165 with further references. 
30 G. Betlem, A. Nollkaemper (2003), p. 572. 
31 Judgment in Von Colson and Kamann, C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153, para. 26.  
32 See judgment in Centrosteel, C-456/98, EU:C:2000:402, para. 16. 
33 See judgment in Wagner Miret, C-334/92, EU:C:1993:945, para. 20. 
34 Judgment in Marleasing, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:395, para. 8. 
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conformity with EU law.35 A basis for consistent interpretation is that 
national law provides for room to interpret a provision. In other words a 
provision must be sufficiently unclear that an interpretation of that provision 
is required.36 The ECJ held in von Colson and Kamann that the 
interpretation and application of national law by the national courts in 
conformity with EU law is obliged as far as its given discretion to do so 
under national law.37 The starting point is therefore national law and it is for 
the national courts to decide according to national methods of interpretation 
if a consistent interpretation of a provision is required. In the case Pfeiffer 
the ECJ also stated that if the national court applies consistent interpretation, 
it is the role of the national judge to choose the methods of interpretation 
which are provided in national law that best achieves the result sought by 
the directive.38  
 
Overall, it is quite a complex analysis that the national courts have to 
conduct in order to determine the necessity of consistent interpretation. At 
first, the national judge must determine the result that the directive aims to 
achieve. Second, an analysis of the national provisions according to 
interpretational methods provided for in national law is to be conducted. At 
that point it can be determined if the result of the application of national 
provisions is not in accordance with the achievable result provided for in the 
directive. In this instance it is worth noting that the national court is not only 
required to examine the provisions implementing the directive but national 
law as a whole.39 If the national court finds that result contradict the result 
the directive seeks to achieve, then the national courts is required to proceed 
to interpret the provision in order to reach the result sought by the 
directive.40  
 
As mentioned above, the notion of indirect effect is that the principles of EU 
law and the rights that is provided from the directives permeates national 
provisions when they are derived from a directive and are subject to the 
discretion of the Member states.41 A consistent interpretation of national law 
is subject to the general principles of EU law, such as legal certainty and 
fundamental rights.42 Therefore, the obligation to interpret national law in 
conformity with EU law does not authorize the national courts to interpret 
national law contra legem.43 In addition, consistent interpretation does not 
preclude the obligation of the Member states to implement a directive into 
their national law by clear rules in order to meet the requirements of legal 
                                                
35 Judgment in Marleasing, C-106/89, EU:C:1990:395, para. 8. 
36 U. Nilsson, Direktivkonform tolkning på mervärdeskatterättens område, (2009), p. 67. 
See also J. Kellgren, Mål och metoder vid tolkning av skattelag (1997), p. 52. 
37 Judgment in Von Colson and Kamann, C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153, para. 28. 
38 Judgment in Pfeiffer and others, C-397/01, EU:C:2004:584, para. 116. 
39 Judgment in Pfeiffer and others, C-397/01, EU:C:2004:584, para. 115. 
40 O. Henkow (2013), p. 15. 
41 A-M. Vlaicu (2011), p. 169. 
42 Judgment in Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, C-80/86, EU:C:1987:431, para. 13. 
43 S. Prechal (2005), p. 194. See also judgment in Adeneler and others, C-212/04, 
EU:C:2006:443, para. 110. 
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certainty.44 A Member state cannot rely on consistent interpretation of a 
provision that has not been correctly implemented into its national 
legislation.45 
 
Essentially, national law must implement directive provisions in a clear and 
precise manner. Where the national provisions provide room for 
interpretation, the national court needs to interpret the provisions in a 
consistent manner. Nevertheless, if the national provision provides room of 
interpretation, the room of interpretation itself presupposes some degree of 
uncertainty.46 
 
The principle of legal certainty as well as the general principles of EU law 
limits the obligation for a consistent interpretation and is regarded as a 
safety net, which prevents the national courts to interpret the law too 
extensively.47 However, a greater basis for a consistent interpretation is 
considered to exist in the areas where there is a complete harmonisation of 
the laws, such as the area of VAT. In those cases, national provisions should 
be open for a more extensive interpretation of the national provisions as 
long as it is within the limits of the directive.48 Therefore, an extensive 
interpretation of the national provision in accordance with a directive should 
in principle not be regarded as affecting legal certainty due to the primacy of 
EU law. The ECJ has not further explained in what way the principle of 
legal certainty limits the obligation of consistent interpretation.49 However, 
the ECJ has stated that the principle of legal certainty must be observed in a 
strict sense when dealing with rules enable to entail financial 
consequences.50 Therefore, one must proceed with caution when performing 
a consistent interpretation in order to not infringe this principle in the area of 
VAT.51  
 
   
                                                
44 See judgment in Commission vs. France, C-197/96, EU:C:1997:155, para. 14-15. 
45 See judgment Commission vs. Netherlands, C-144/99, EU:C:2001:257, para. 21. 
46 U. Nilsson (2009), p.73. 
47 S. Prechal (2005), p. 208. 
48 K. Ståhl, Fusionsdirektivet: svensk beskattning i EG-rättslig belysning (2005), p. 74. 
49 U. Nilsson (2009), p.72. 
50 See for example judgments in Teleos and Others, C-409/04, EU:C:2007:548, para. 48 
and Halifax and Others, C-255/02, EU:C:2006:121, para. 72. 
51 See S. Prechal (2005), p. 213; J. Kellgren (1997), p. 53.  
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3 Methods of interpretation 
used by the ECJ 
3.1 Initial observations 
Since there is an obligation for national courts to interpret their law in 
conformity with EU law, it is important to understand the interpretation of 
the provisions on EU level. There is no legal support in EU law provisions 
concerning the interpretation of EU law. The matter of interpretation has 
been dealt with explicitly neither in the treaties nor in the secondary law.52 
However, the ECJ has adopted certain methods to interpret EU law that can 
serve as guidelines. Where the methods of interpretation have not clearly 
been expressed by the ECJ, there are three methods of interpretation that can 
be deduced from the consistent use by the ECJ in the case law, namely the 
literal, contextual and teleological interpretation method.53 These methods 
are not entirely a new way of interpreting law, since they are also stated in 
the Vienna convention on the law of the treaties and considered 
internationally acknowledged methods of interpretation.54 Nevertheless, the 
frequent references to them by the ECJ has in some ways distinguished 
them as tools for the ECJ to use.   
 
The ECJ has referred to these methods very early on in its case law. First, in 
the case Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique the ECJ stated, “It is 
necessary to consider not only (the) wording of a provision [of Community 
law] but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of 
which it is part.”55 Later on, in the case Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ stated 
that in order to assess the scope of international provisions “it is necessary 
to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of those 
provisions.”56 This approach of interpretation has been maintained and 
consistent over the decades, as the ECJ in recent case law, has stated the 
same approach.57 There is also confirmation in the tax doctrine regarding the 
methods used by the ECJ. For example, AG Poires Maduro describes the 
legal interpretation of the ECJ as being governed by text, context and teleos 
(purpose).58 Others have described the methods as criteria of interpretation 
                                                
52 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 539. 
53 C. Amand, The Limits of the EU VAT Exemptions for Financial Services, (2009), p. 265.   
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969,1155, U.N.T.S, articles 31-
32.  
55 Judgment in Federation Charbonniere de Belgique, C-8/55, EU:C:1956:11. 
56 Judgment in Van Gend en Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1, p. 3.  
57 See for example Judgment in Klarenberg , C-466/07, EU:C:2009:85, para. 37 and the 
case law cited therein.  
58 M. Poires Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of 
Constitutional Pluralism, (2007), p. 4. 
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such as linguistic, systemic (contextual) and dynamic criteria.59 
Nevertheless, despite the terminology they agree on the same approach.  
 
The ECJ does not only confer to one method of interpretation when 
interpreting EU law. The interpretational approach of the ECJ is describes as 
being that the ECJ applies one method first and then confirms its results 
with reference to a second method.60 In addition, historical context of the 
provisions is also applied as guidance to how the provisions were meant to 
apply. 
 
The following sections will provide for further description of each method 
of interpretation. 
 
3.2 Literal interpretation  
The literal interpretation method is sometimes referred to as the linguistic 
criteria employed by the ECJ and is described as the traditional method of 
interpretation. The basis for this method sets out from the sense of the 
“proper meaning of the words”.61  
 
Naturally, some issues follow with an interpretation of a provision 
according to the proper meaning of the words in a legal system such as the 
one in the EU. Since the EU consists of several Member states with 
different languages, a wording in one language does not necessarily have the 
same meaning as an identical wording in another language. Consequently, 
this gives rise to the difficulty of determining which draft of the EU 
provision to use in order to interpret the provision according to the proper 
meaning of the words. According to article 55 of the TEU, the texts of the 
Treaties in each of the EU member states are equally authentic. It is also 
worth mentioning a regulation adopted by the Council that establishes the 
equality of the official languages in the EU.62 Although, this regulation is 
only binding to the institutions of the Union and cannot be relied upon by 
individuals, the regulation has been referred to as laying down the principle 
of linguistic equality within the EU.63 By treating each version of EU law as 
an authoritative original, this will provide for the EU members to all be 
treated equally.64  
 
                                                
59 J. Bengoetxea, The legal reasoning of the European court of justice: Towards a 
European Jurisprudence (1993), p. 234.  
60 C. Amand (2009), p. 265. Se also Judgment in Plato Plastik Robert Frank, C-341/01, 
EU:C:2004:254, para. 54.   
61 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 550. 
62 Council Regulation 1/1958, Determining the Languages to be Used by the European 
Economic Community, 1958 O.J. (385) 58 EEC. With the accession of a new Member state 
into the EU the regulation has been amended accordingly. 
63 K. Lennaerts, J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To say what the Law is: Methods of Interpretation 
and the European Court of Justice, (2014), p. 10.  
64 L. M. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual statutes by the European Court of 
Justice, (2009), p. 279. 
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A confirmation of this view can also be located in the case law of the ECJ. 
The ECJ has stated that the interpretation of a community provision cannot 
depart from one language version of the provision but should be considered 
with regard to other existing official language versions. In principle, all the 
language versions must be recognised as having the same weight when 
interpreting community law.65 In the case CILFIT, the ECJ held that 
community legislation is drafted in several languages and that all the 
language versions are all equally authentic. An interpretation of community 
law thus involves a comparison of the different language versions.66 In 
addition, by taking into account all the language versions in the EU while 
interpreting a provision of EU law is a way of ensuring the uniform 
application of the provision within the whole EU.67 However, most of the 
issues that arises when interpreting a provision literally arises when two or 
more language versions deviate from one another regarding the same 
provision. The difficulty then becomes to establish which wording to use to 
interpret the provision without neglecting the status of the other language 
versions as official.   
 
Looking at the case law of the ECJ where there is a divergence between one 
and more of the language versions, the approach of the ECJ has been to 
interpret the provisions in accordance with the wording that is consistent 
with the most language versions in the EU. In the joined cases Denkavit and 
others, the ECJ in application of the literal interpretation method, examined 
all language versions to discover the wording that was the most consistent 
with the different language versions.68 All the language versions in the 
current case except the Danish one used the same wording, which resulted 
in the ECJ disregarding the wording of the Danish language version in the 
interpretation of the provision in question. The same line of reasoning was 
adopted by the ECJ in a much older judgment Regina v Bochereau, where 
the ECJ also examined the wording of the provision in the different 
language versions and based its interpretation on the wording which was the 
most consistent in the different versions.69 
 
In order to ensure the objectives of the principle of legal certainty as far as 
possible, the literal interpretation is the method that best reflects that 
principle since it ensures a high degree of predictability.70 However, as the 
ECJ has stated, the literal interpretation method is not enough to rely on 
where there is an existence of linguistic divergences between the different 
language versions.71 In addition, nothing precludes the ECJ from relying on 
the contextual or the teleological interpretation of a provision, if the literal 
                                                
65 Se Judgment in EMU Tabac and Others, C-296/95, EU:C:1998:152, para. 36. 
66 Judgment in CILFIT, C-283/81, EU:C:1982:335, para. 18.  
67 Judgment in Les Verts, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 25. K. Lennaerts, J. A. 
Gutiérrez-Fons (2014), p. 13.  
68 Judgment in Denkavit and Others, C-283/94, EU:C:1996:387, para. 25.  
69 Judgment in Regina v. Bochereau, case 30/77, EU:C:1977:172, para. 13. 
70 H. Rasmussen, Towards a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community Law, 
(1992), p. 167-171.  
71See for ex. Judgment in Plato Plastik Robert Frank, C-341/01, EU:C:2004:254, para. 64.   
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interpretation of the provision is at odds with the common meaning of the 
other language versions.72 This will be further described below.  
       
3.3 Contextual interpretation 
The wording of a provision cannot solely be enough to rely on if there is any 
doubt to how a provision should be interpreted. Therefore the provision 
must be examined with regard to the context it is in, also referred to as 
contextual interpretation.  
 
In the literature, the contextual interpretation method, sometimes referred to 
as the systemic criteria73, have been described from two different 
perspectives. The first perspective is from an internal point of view where 
the contextual interpretation is seen to focus on the purely normative context 
in which the EU law provision in question is placed. The second perspective 
is from an external point of view where the contextual interpretation is seen 
to focus on the decision making process which led to the adoption of the EU 
law provision in question.74 Overall, provisions interpreted by the contextual 
interpretation method, should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with 
the system they are placed in. This means taking into account all the 
principles, rules and characteristics of the legal system of which the 
provision in question is part.75 In the contextual interpretation the ECJ has 
also considered the structure of the provision. For example the interpretation 
of a provision is influenced by if the provision in question constitutes a main 
rule or an exemption from the main rule, since exemptions from the main 
rule generally are interpreted strictly.76   
 
As mentioned above, one interpretation method is not solely relied on when 
interpreting EU law provisions. Usually the literal interpretation method is 
supplemented with the contextual or the teleological interpretation methods 
in order to confirm the result.77  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
72 See for ex. Judgment in Konservenfabrik Lubella, C-64/95, EU:C:1996:388, para. 18. 
73 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 552.  
74 K. Lennaerts, J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons (2014), p. 16.  
75 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 552.   
76 J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson (2012), p. 168.  
77 See for ex. opinion of AG Trstenjak in Deutsche Telekom, C-543/09, EU:C:2011:90, 
para. 46-62 and Judgment in Denkavit and Others, C-283/94, EU:C:1996:387, para. 26. See 
also above, C. Amand (2009), p. 265. 
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3.4 Teleological interpretation 
Apart from interpreting a provision with regard to its context, the ECJ has 
also adopted a method to interpret a provision with regard to its purpose, 
known as the teleological approach. The teleological interpretation method 
is one thing that distinguishes the ECJ from other courts. The ECJ has made 
itself known to apply this method targeting the purpose of the provision in 
question. The reason for developing this method has been described as 
being that EU law provisions in many aspects are not sufficiently clear and 
precise and therefore needs a more extensive interpretation in order to 
determine their actual meaning.78 In the case Hong Kong Trade the question 
asked to the ECJ was whether an organisation who provided services free of 
charge constituted a taxable person according to the Second VAT 
Directive.79 The ECJ found that a literal interpretation of article 2 and 4 in 
the directive does not provide for any guidance as to how these provisions 
shall be interpreted regarding services provided free of charge. Therefore, 
this “indicates that it would be advisable to identify the relevant features of 
the common system of value added tax in light of its purpose.”80  
 
The teleological interpretation has been explained as having mainly three 
different purposes. To facilitate the purpose that the provision in question 
strives to achieve, to eliminate a potential absurd result of a strictly literal 
interpretation of a provision and to fill out the slots that would otherwise 
exist in EU law.81 The most traditional use of the teleological interpretation 
method is to facilitate the purpose of the provision. For instance, the case 
Sturgeon and Others concerned the interpretation of Regulation 261/2004.82 
The regulation confers a right of compensation to airline passengers whose 
flights are cancelled. Since the regulation did not expressly state a right of 
compensation to other passengers than those whose flights were cancelled, 
the question referred to the ECJ was whether this regulation also applied to 
passengers whose flights were delayed. The ECJ observed that the objective 
of the regulation is to ensure a high level of protection for air passengers 
whether it concerns passengers whose flight are cancelled or delayed.83 The 
ECJ continued by stating that community acts must also be interpreted in 
accordance with primary law and in this case the principle of equal 
treatment becomes relevant. On those grounds the ECJ ruled that the 
regulation in question must be interpreted as to also conferring a right to 
compensation to those passengers whose flights were delayed.84  
 
                                                
78 J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson (2012), p. 168. 
79 Judgment in Hong Kong Trade, C-89/81, EU:C:1982:121. 
80 Judgment in Hong Kong Trade, C-89/81, EU:C:1982:121, para. 5. 
81 H.G. Schermes, D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union (2001), p. 
21. 
82 Judgment in Sturgeon and Others, C-402/07, EU:C:2009:716. 
83 Judgment in Sturgeon and Others, C-402/07, EU:C:2009:716, para. 44.   
84 Judgment in Sturgeon and Others, C-402/07, EU:C:2009:716, para. 69. However, the 
judgment in Sturgeon and Others has been criticized, see judgment in Nelson and Others, 
C-581/10, EU:C:2012:657.     
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The ECJ also applies the teleological method in order for the result of the 
interpretation to be in line with the objective of the EU and its principles.85 
In the case Les Verts, the question posed to the ECJ was whether a 
procedure of annulment, according to article 173 in the EC treaty, could be 
raised against a decision from the European Parliament by an association 
affected by the parliament’s decision.86  The core matter in this case was 
that article 173 in the EC treaty did not include the acts adopted by the 
European Parliament, which meant that their acts could not be challenged. 
The ECJ observed that the general scheme of the EC treaty is to make a 
direct action available against all measures adopted by the institutions that 
are intended to have legal effect.87 The ECJ held that article 173 in the 
Treaty also covers acts adopted by the parliament since this would otherwise 
be considered to be against the spirit of the Treaty and to its system.88    
 
As seen above, the teleological interpretation has been given a special status 
in EU law. It does not only refer to a purposive driven interpretation of a 
provision but also to a systemic understanding of a provision with regard to 
the rules in the EU legal order.89 Nevertheless, it has been questioned when 
the court uses the teleological method to extend the applicability of EU law 
provisions beyond their wording and context, since it means that the ECJ is 
acting not solely as a judicial instance but also assuming the role of the 
legislator.90  
 
3.5 Literal, contextual or teleological 
interpretation? 
An obvious question to ask at this point is how the different methods of 
interpretation apply in relation to each other. According to settled case law, 
the ECJ departs from the literal interpretation method when interpreting 
community provisions. As the AG Stix-Hackl noted in her opinion, the 
starting point for assessing a provision, in this case article 23 of a 
cooperation agreement concluded between the EU and Russia, must be the 
wording.91 Following the principle of “In Claris non fit interpretio”, if the 
meaning of the provision is clear then there is no room for interpretation, the 
literal interpretation should serve as the starting point from an 
interpretational point of view.92 In addition, the literal interpretation must 
take precedence over other methods of interpretation since the wording of a 
provision could be used to provide evidence in the determination of the 
                                                
85 J. Hettne, I. O. Eriksson (2012), p. 169. 
86 Judgment in Les Verts, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166. 
87 Judgment in Les Verts, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 24.  
88 Judgment in Les Verts, C-294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 25.  
89 M. Poires Maduro (2007), p. 5. 
90 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 550. See also judgment in Nelson and Others, C-581/10, 
EU:C:2012:657.  
91 AG opinion in Simutenkov, C-265/03, EU:C:2005:6, para. 14. 
92 G. Itzcovisch (2009), p. 550. 
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legislative purpose of the provision.93 Although, there has been some 
opinions that suggests that the ECJ style of interpretation is relatively free. 
The court does not see itself bound to apply one method before another and 
rather considers the contextual and teleological methods of special 
importance.94 As mentioned above, the meaning of a provision cannot 
always be ascertained based on the wording. In those circumstances the 
provisions must be viewed in light of their context and purpose.95 Moreover, 
as the ECJ has stated in its case law, to interpret a community provision it is 
not only the wording that needs to be considered but also the context and the 
purpose of the provision.96 In the case CILFIT the ECJ stated the following 
in its judgment:  
 
“every provision of Community law must be placed in its 
context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of 
Community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives 
thereof an its state of evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied.”97 
 
However, according to a general principle of interpretation, when a 
provision is open to several interpretations preference must be given to that 
interpretation that ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness.98 The 
principle of effectiveness is stated in the EU treaties and thus applies as 
primary law within the EU.  
 
So to answer the question on how to apply the interpretation methods in 
relation to each other, answers can only be provided as to examine the literal 
wording first. However, how the ECJ applies the other methods from that 
point is guided by the purpose of ensuring that EU provisions are as 
effective as possible. If that result is derived from the context of a provision 
or its purpose, is determined in the particular case, as shown by the case law 
of the ECJ.      
                                                
93 L. M. Solan (2009), p. 283. 
94 C. Gulmann, Methods of Interpretation of the European Court of Justice, (1980), p. 198-
199.  
95 See further references under section 3.2.  
96 See for ex. Judgment in Merck, C-292/82, EU:C:1983:335; Judgment in CILFIT, 281/83, 
EU:C:1982:335.  
97 Judgment in CILFIT, 281/83, EU:C:1982:335, para. 20.  
98 Judgment in Commission v. France, C-434/97, EU:C:2000:98, para. 19. 
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4 Interpretation of the 
exemptions in the VAT 
directive 
4.1 Interpretation of VAT exemptions in 
general 
As explained above, the ECJ has established certain interpretational 
methods in order to interpret EU law provisions. In the case of exemptions, 
these methods are applicable but in a slightly modified way. Exemptions 
provide for derogations from the main principle and in the area of VAT this 
principle is that VAT is a general tax on consumption.99 The concept of 
exemptions in the VAT area has been described in the tax doctrine as a very 
complex notion and has been met with some scepticism because of the 
repercussions they have in the VAT system.100  
 
The ECJ has in most cases stated that exemptions in the VAT area 
constitutes exemptions from the general principle of VAT, that turnover tax 
is to be levied on all goods and services supplied for consideration by a 
taxable person, and should therefore be interpreted strictly.101 The strict 
interpretation can be explained as an expression of the literal interpretation 
method but only concerning exemptions. The strict in this sense aims at not 
extending the scope of the provision than what is provided by its wording.102 
This requires the ECJ to examine the wording of the provision and the 
meaning of those words in all the official language versions of the EU and 
the interpretation must depart from the wording of the provision that is 
consistent with most language versions of the provision.103  
 
The preference of the ECJ of referring to the strict interpretation method 
when interpreting VAT exemptions is well documented in the case law. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ has also made reference to the contextual 
interpretation method in its judgments. In usage of the contextual 
interpretation in the area of VAT, the ECJ examines the provisions from 
                                                
99 An expression of this principle is found in article 1 of the VAT directive.  
100 See for example R. de la Feria, The EU VAT Treatment of insurance and financial 
services (again) under review, (2007), p. 74; C. Amand (2010), p. 409; B. Terra, J. Kajus 
(2010), p. 2215.   
101 Judgment in Stichting Uitvoering Financiële, C-348/87, EU:C:1989:246, para. 13. See 
also judgment in Volker Ludwig, C-453/05, EU:C:2007:369, para. 21 and the case-law cited 
therein. 
102 See for example the reasoning of the ECJ in judgment in Klinikum Dortmund, C-366/12, 
EU:C:2014:143, para. 32. 
103 Judgment in Commission vs. Italy, C-122/87, EU:C:1988:256, para. 9. See also section 
3.2 above. 
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both an external and internal point of view.104 The internal element is the 
general statement of the ECJ regarding the interpretation of the exemptions. 
VAT exemptions constitute independent concepts of EU law and must 
therefore be placed in the general context of the common system of VAT as 
introduced by the directive.105 The meaning of this is that the exemptions 
constitute derogations in relation to the general context. Which in itself 
requires a strict interpretation. Furthermore, the internal element provides 
for an examination of the exemption provisions in relation to the context in 
which they appear.106   
 
Every provision of EU law must be put in its context and interpreted with 
regard to the objectives of EU law as a whole i.e. the systematic context of 
the provisions. Therefore, a contextual interpretation of a provision does not 
solely refer to the context of the sentence in which the provision appears.107 
It is also aimed at putting the provisions in a historical context, thus 
applying a historical interpretation method. Based on that, the interpretation 
of the VAT exemptions must therefore take into account the intention of the 
legislator at the time when the rules were introduced in 1977.108 Thus, the 
provisions are placed in the context of the system of rules of which they are 
part, i.e. using the contextual interpretation from an external point of 
view.109  
 
Moreover, when interpreting VAT exemptions, the ECJ has referred to the 
purpose of the VAT exemption provisions, consequently applying the 
teleological interpretation method. In the case Abbey National, the ECJ 
stated that the exemptions in the VAT directive have their own independent 
meaning. Therefore, they need to be interpreted with regard to the purpose 
of the directive, which is “to avoid divergences in the application of the 
VAT system from one Member state to another.”110 In addition, the ECJ has 
highlighted a purpose for exempting specific services from VAT.111 
 
However, the one thing that distinguishes the interpretation of the provisions 
in the VAT area, among them VAT exemptions, is the usage of the principle 
of fiscal neutrality as a method of interpretation. The ECJ has stated that the 
principle of fiscal neutrality is a principle of interpretation that should be 
applied together with the principle of strict interpretation when interpreting 
exemptions.112 A demonstration of this usage is found in the case JP 
                                                
104 See section 3.3. This will be further exemplified below.  
105 See for example the judgment in Stichting Uitvoering Financiële, C-348/87, 
EU:C:1989:246, para. 11 and judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 21. The ECJ 
makes reference to the 11th recital in the preamble of the Sixth directive. 
106 See section 4.3.3. 
107 C. Amand (2009), p. 267. 
108 M. Walpole and R. de la Feria, Options for Taxing Financial supplies in Value added 
tax: EU VAT and Australian GST Models Compared, (2009), p. 902. 
109 See section 3.3. 
110 Judgment in Abbey National, C-169/04, EU:C:2006:289, para. 38. 
111 See for ex. Judgments in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C-455/05, EU:C:2007:232 and 
Abbey National, C-169/04, EU:C:2006:289. This will be further dealt with below.  
112 Judgment in Deutsche Bank, C-44/11, EU:C:2012:484, para. 45.  
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Morgan, where the ECJ held that a VAT exemption provision cannot be 
interpreted as providing a different treatment for VAT purposes of 
economic operators carrying out the same transactions.113 This principle 
does not apply as primary law within the EU but is intended to reflect the 
general principle of equal treatment in matters relating to VAT.114    
 
4.2 Financial service exemption in the 
VAT Directive 
The exemption for financial services in the VAT directive is perhaps the 
area in VAT that has been subject to most development over the last 
decades. The topic of financial services has been frequently discussed over a 
long time but the actual reason for exempting these services have never been 
clearly specified.115 Looking at the preparatory acts that preceded the 
adoption of the Sixth Directive it is only mentioned that the exemptions for 
other services relating to a specific field, among them financial services, set 
out in article 14 section B of the Sixth directive are justified for reasons of 
general policy common to all Member states.116 Only a few reasons were 
given for exempting financial services under the Sixth directive. The first 
was that the turnover tax replaced by the VAT did not apply to financial 
services and it would therefore be logical not taxing these services under a 
VAT. Second, most Member states already applied other taxes to these kind 
of services, such as insurance premium tax and a payroll tax.117  
 
The difficulties of the exemption for financial services are often described 
as being that the exemption provision does not provide for clear definitions 
of the scope. The ECJ has been called upon on several occasions to interpret 
the various factors of the exemption.118 The exemption for financial services 
has mainly been construed to avoid practical difficulties as opposed to the 
exemptions for public bodies and health services. The main reason for this 
difficulty is that it is hard to determine the taxable amount. Along with 
leasing of immovable property and gambling activities, financial services 
form part of a group of services that are considered to be too difficult to 
tax.119 Nevertheless, there is a lot of disagreement on how financial services 
should be treated for VAT purposes. Many opinions in the doctrine consider 
                                                
113 Judgment in JP Morgan, C-363/05, EU:C:2007:391, para. 29. 
114 See judgment in NCC Construction Danmark, C-174/08, EU:C:2009:669, para. 41. See 
also C. Amand, VAT neutrality: a principle of EU law or a principle of the VAT system? 
(2013), p. 164. 
115 Report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A6-0344/2008, p. 22. 
116 Art. 14 of the Proposal for a Sixth council directive, Commission of the EC, suppl. 
11/73. Art. 14 of the proposal corresponded with art. 13 of the definitive version of the 
Sixth Directive. 
117 R. F. van Brederode, New Developments in the European Union: Taxation of Financial 
Services Under a Credit Invoice Method VAT (1995), p. 5-6. 
118 C. Amand (2010), p. 409.  
119 R. de la Feria (2007), p. 74. 
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it more proper to include financial services in the tax base and not 
exempting them.120     
 
However, most financial services are exempt under article 135(1)(b) to (g) 
in the VAT directive. The article has the following wording:  
 
“1. Member States shall exempt the following transactions:   
… 
(b) the granting and negotiation of credit and the management of credit by 
the person granting it; 
(c) the negotiation of or any dealings in credit guarantees or any other 
security for money and the management of credit guarantees by the person 
who is granting the credit; 
(d) transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current 
accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable 
instruments, but excluding debt collection; 
(e) transactions, including negotiation, concerning currency, bank notes 
and coins used as legal tender, with the exception of collectors’ items, that 
is to say, gold, silver or other metal coins or bank notes which are not 
normally used as legal tender or coins of numismatic interest; 
(f) transactions, including negotiation but not management or safekeeping, 
in shares, interests in companies or associations, debentures and other 
securities, but excluding documents establishing title to goods, and the 
rights or securities referred to in Article 15(2); 
(g) the management of special investment funds as defined by Members 
States;”  
 
The problematic task of interpreting the scope of the exemptions has been 
especially difficult in the case of financial services. Developments of new 
forms of financial products and supply structures have created uncertainty 
as to what is actually considered to be included in the scope of the 
exemption provision and what is not.121 It is therefore important to examine 
the case law in this area in order to get a clearer picture of how the financial 
service exemption is to be interpreted and applied according to the ECJ. The 
following chapter will deal with the case law of the ECJ that has in some 
ways provided for an explanation to how EU law stands in terms of 
applying and interpreting this exemption.  
 
                                                
120 The doctrinal debate features a lot of material on this subject. Examples are M. Walpole 
and R. de la Feria (2009); F. Borselli, A Sensible reform of the EU VAT Regime for 
Financial Services (2009); R. F. van Brederode, New Developments in the European 
Union: Taxation of Financial Services Under a Credit Invoice Method VAT (1995).  
121 M. Walpole and R. de la Feria (2009), p. 900.  
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4.3 The exemption for financial services 
as interpreted by the ECJ 
4.3.1 Case SDC C-2/95 
Article 135(1) has been subject to a great amount of case law from the ECJ 
and one case is prominent among them, the case SDC.122 SDC is considered 
to be a landmark case with regard to the interpretation of the exemption 
provision because it is in this case where the ECJ started to define and 
evolve the scope of the exemptions under article 135(1) in the VAT 
directive.  
 
SDC was an association that provided services relating to transfers, advice 
on, trade in, management of deposits and purchase contracts and loans. The 
association was registered for VAT purposes and most of its members were 
savings banks. A typical service performed by SDC was described as 
consisting of a number of components, which added together, made up a 
service which a bank or its customers wished to had performed. SDC only 
performed these services upon request of a bank or its customers. SDC 
applied to the Danish Customs and Tax Directorate that the services it 
performed relating to certain transfers should be covered by the exemption 
provided for by article 2(3)(j) in the Danish VAT law, implementing article 
13B(d) in the Sixth directive. The Directorate granted the application but the 
decision was later overturned by the Danish VAT Tribunal, who decided 
that the services provided by SDC were subject to VAT. The SDC appealed 
against the decision of the VAT Tribunal to the Danish administrative court, 
which decided to stay the proceedings and refer a couple of questions to the 
ECJ.123       
 
The first question posed by the national court was if the services that SDC 
performed are covered by the exemptions in article 135(1)(d) and (f), and if 
it made any difference if these services were performed wholly or in part 
electronically for the purpose of the exemption. Second, the national court 
wanted to know if the specification of the person providing the service in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of article 135(1) were important to bear in mind when 
interpreting the paragraphs (d) and (f) in the same article. Third, the national 
court asked if services that are provided to parties performing exempt 
activities under paragraph 135(1)(d) and (f) by a third party, also falls within 
the scope of those provisions and therefore also exempt from VAT or is the 
entire service required to be performed by a financial institution in order to 
benefit from the exemption. In addition, is a contractual link between the 
person performing the exempt service and the customer required for the 
purpose of the exemption. Fourth, the national court asked how the 
expression “transactions… concerning transfers” in paragraph (d) should be 
interpreted and if the VAT exemption in article 135(1)(d) and (f) also 
                                                
122 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278. 
123 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 7-15.  
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applied to a person performing only a part of an exempt financial service or 
only carries out certain operations necessary to supply an exempt financial 
service.      
 
The ECJ began with stating that the assessment of the exemptions stated in 
article 135(d) and (f) must be based on the nature of the service provided 
and not according to the person that is supplying the service. The 
exemptions in paragraphs (d) and (f) are different than the exemptions 
provided for in paragraphs (b) and (c) since their wording does not clearly 
specify the person performing the exempt activity. Therefore, the person 
providing the service is irrelevant since the exemption from VAT is 
connected to the service itself.124 This also applies to the manner in which 
the service in question is performed. The provision in question does not 
provide for any restrictions regarding how the service is performed. 
Whether it is performed electronically or not does not affect the application 
of the exemption. Only the fact that the service is performed electronically 
does not preclude the service from being exempt.125   
 
The ECJ then continued by examining the need of a contractual link as was 
asked in the third question. The ECJ observed that the contractual link 
between a customer and the bank does not diminish the role of the data-
handling center since the data-handling center in reality performs the service 
requested by the customer even though the services of the data-handling 
center are provided to the bank itself and alters the financial situation of the 
bank.126 The ECJ therefore rejected the argument that paragraph (d) in 
article 135(1) only covered services that were provided by a financial 
institution to the end consumer since the practical effect would be that only 
certain transfer transactions would be exempt and there is no support in the 
wording of the article for such a restriction of the scope.127  
 
Regarding the fourth question, the ECJ stated that given that exemptions 
must be interpreted strictly the mere fact that a service constitutes an 
element essential to perform a complete exempt transaction cannot 
guarantee the service to qualify as exempt. In order for a service to be 
classified as an exempt service under article 135(1)(d) and (f) the service 
must viewed broadly, form a distinct whole and fulfil in effect the specific 
and essential functions of that provision. For a transaction concerning 
transfers the service in question must therefore have the effect of 
transferring funds and entail changes in the financial and legal situation. 
However, there is nothing that prevents services from being broken down 
into separate services which would then constitute transactions concerning 
transfer within the meaning of the provision.128   
                                                
124 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 32-33. This confirms the view that was 
held by the ECJ in the previous judgment, Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, EU:C:1993:855, 
para. 13. The case is further examined below.  
125 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 37. 
126 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 55. 
127 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 56. 
128 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 64 and 66. 
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After providing these answers to the questions referred to it by the national 
court the ECJ referred the case back to the national court for it to deliver a 
judgment. It was for the national court to determine if the services that SDC 
performed fulfilled the criteria established by the ECJ since it was more 
familiar with all the facts in the case.129 
 
4.3.2 Determining critieria for financial service 
exemption 
The judgment in SDC spurred a certain interpretational approach in terms of 
interpreting article 135(1). However, this was not the first time that the ECJ 
has been asked to interpret article 135(1). In the case Muys’ en de Winter, 
the ECJ was asked to interpret the expression in article 135(1)(b), “the 
granting and negotiation of credit and the management of credit by the 
person granting it”. The case concerned a deferred payment for a supply of 
land to the date of delivery instead of payment when the contract was 
signed. In order for the customer to defer the payment, the customer had to 
pay an interest.130 According to the Dutch tax authorities, the interest paid 
on the deferred payment did not constitute a consideration for the granting 
of the credit but should be considered as consideration for the actual supply 
of the land and therefore subject to VAT.  
 
In its judgment, the ECJ held that the deferring of payment in return for 
payment of interest might in principle be regarded as granting of credit 
within the meaning of the provision in the directive.131 The ECJ continued 
by stating that, even though exemptions should be interpreted strictly, 
without a clear specification of the borrower and lender in the directive, the 
wording of article 135(1)(b) is broad enough to cover the situation in 
question. Such a treatment would otherwise be contrary to the objective of 
the VAT system.132 According to the ECJ the interest paid in case of a 
deferred payment is covered by the exemption in article 135(1)(b) since the 
situation is regarded as granting an exempt credit within the meaning of that 
provision.            
 
The criteria introduced by the ECJ in SDC were further specified in the case 
CSC Financial Services. In reference to the judgment in SDC the ECJ 
stated, in addition to the service having to form a “distinct whole”, that an 
exempt service must be distinguished from a mere physical and technical 
supply.133 This mere physical and technical supply also needs to alter the 
legal or financial situation in order for the exemptions to apply to the service 
                                                
129 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 67. 
130 Judgment in Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, EU:C:1993:855, para. 5. 
131 Judgment in Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, EU:C:1993:855, para. 12. 
132 Judgment in Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, EU:C:1993:855, para. 13-14. 
133 Judgment in CSC Financial Services, C-235/00, EU:C:2001:696, para. 26. 
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in question.134 The wording of the provision in article 135(1)(f) does not 
provide for activities that does not create, alter or extinguish parties rights 
and obligations in respect of securities to be exempt. Even though the 
services that CSC provided in the case were essential to complete such a 
financial transaction, they constituted merely a preliminary stage of the 
transaction and formed such a little part of the total service. Therefore, the 
services were considered not to come within the scope of the exemption.135  
 
Three years after the case CSC was decided, the ECJ dealt with the 
interpretation of article 135(1) once again in the case Abbey National.136 The 
question posed to the ECJ concerned if management activities related to 
management of special investment funds also were covered by the 
exemption in article 135(1)(g) when provided by a third party. The ECJ 
maintained the approach stated in the previous judgments that the 
exemption was referred to the service itself and not to the person providing 
the service.137 Moreover, in order for a service to benefit from the 
exemption in article 135(1)(g) the service must fulfil the “distinct whole” 
criteria established in the case SDC. In addition, the wording of the 
provision in question does not preclude the services provided from being 
broken down into a number of separate services each covered by the 
exemptions as long as they fulfil the “distinct whole” criteria.138  
 
It is interesting to note that in the case Abbey National the AG did not 
consider the distinct whole criteria appropriate to apply when interpreting 
article 135(1)(g) in the same sense as the ECJ has established it for the other 
paragraphs in article 135(1). According to AG Kokott, the concept of 
management in paragraph (g) is more general and does not relate to specific 
operations in the same way as the other paragraphs in article 135(1). 
Therefore, when interpreting paragraph (g) it is more appropriate that the 
interpretation should depart from the purpose and context of article 135(1) 
rather than general criteria.139  
 
However, the ECJ does not seem to have adopted the same view. In the case 
GfBk, the ECJ was asked again to interpret the concept of management in 
paragraph (g). The question concerned specifically management services 
that are provided by a third party.140 Here the ECJ reiterated the distinct 
whole criteria and stated that in order to determine if the services provided 
fall within the scope of paragraph (g) it has to be examined whether the 
                                                
134 Judgment in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 73 and judgment in CSC Financial 
Services, C-235/00, EU:C:2001:696, para. 28. 
135 Judgment in CSC Financial Services, C-235/00, EU:C:2001:696, para. 31-32.  
136 Judgment in Abbey National II, C-169/04, EU:C:2006:289. 
137 Judgment in Abbey National II, C-169/04, EU:C:2006:289, para. 66. See also the 
judgments in SDC, C-2/95, EU:C:1997:278, para. 32-33 and Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, 
EU:C:1993:855, para. 13.  
138 Judgment in Abbey National II, C-169/04, EU:C:2006:289, para. 67 and 70.  
139 AG opinion in Abbey National II, C-169/04, EU:C:2005:523, para. 63 and 67.  
140 Judgment in GfBk, C-275/11, EU:C:2013:141. 
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services has the effect of performing the specific and essential functions of 
management of a special investment fund.141  
 
The ECJ adopted the same reasoning in the case ATP Pension Service, in 
which the ECJ delivered its judgment last year. Although the ECJ regarded 
the purpose of the exemption in paragraph (g) as being to facilitate 
investment in securities through investment undertakings, the services 
provided by a third party must fulfil the distinct whole criteria in order to be 
covered by the exemption. 142    
 
After the case Abbey National, the ECJ delivered its judgment in the case 
Volker Ludwig. This case concerned the interpretation of paragraph (b) in 
article 135(1) and the question posed to the ECJ was if paragraph (b) 
requires either a contractual or direct link between the person negotiating 
the credit and the borrower in order for the exemption to be applicable. In 
essence, the question sought to be answered was if article 135(1)(b) also 
covers credit negotiation by a third party. The answer is relevant in order to 
determine if the nature of the person providing the service is considered to 
be fundamental in the case of outsourcing credit-related activities.143 The 
ECJ began by reiterating that exempt transactions under article 135(1) are 
defined in terms of the service provided and not by the person supplying and 
receiving the service. A contractual link is therefore not required in order to 
benefit from the exemption within the meaning of the provision since the 
wording of the article does not define the identity of the negotiator.144  After 
establishing that the negotiation service provided is considered to be the 
principal service the ECJ continued by examining the concept of negotiation 
within the meaning of article 135(1)(b). With reference to its previous 
rulings in SDC and Abbey National, the ECJ repeated its statement that in 
order for the service to be considered exempt, the service must, viewed 
broadly, form a distinct whole and fulfil in effect the specific and essential 
functions of the provision, in this case of negotiation.145 Negotiation in the 
sense of article 135(1)(b) is considered to be an act of mediation and could 
have several purposes and the negotiation that is described in this case is 
covered by this exemption according to the ECJ. Therefore the ECJ 
answered the question posed by the national court in the negative thus 
maintaining the relevance of the “distinct whole” criteria when determining 
the scope of financial supplies.  
 
With regard to the above and, judging by recent case law, the criteria still 
plays an important part in the interpretational approach of the ECJ regarding 
the financial service exemption.146    
                                                
141 Judgment in GfBk, C-275/11, EU:C:2013:141, para. 21 and 23. 
142 Judgment in ATP Pension Service, C-464/12, EU:C:2014:139, para. 62 and 65. The 
purpose of the exemption referred to by the ECJ was also stated by the AG in her opinion in 
the case Abbey National, EU:C:2005:523, para. 68. 
143 R. de la Feria (2007), p. 86. 
144 Judgment in Volker Ludwig, C-453/05, EU:C:2007:369, para. 25-26. 
145 Judgment in Volker Ludwig, C-453/05, EU:C:2007:369, para. 27 and 36. 
146 See for ex. Judgments in Nordea Pankki, C-350/10, EU:C:2011:532 and Granton 
Advertising, C-461/12, EU:C:2014:1745. 
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4.3.3 The usage of the interpretational methods  
As the above analysis demonstrates, the ECJ has dealt with the 
interpretation of article 135(1)(b) to (g) on numerous occasions and 
although the ECJ starts its reasoning by referring to the general approach 
when interpreting VAT exemptions, the interpretational methods established 
were not entirely prominent in the reasoning of the ECJ. No real emphasis is 
placed on the interpretation of the exemptions with regard to either context 
or purpose in the earlier cases. Instead, the ECJ departs from the “distinct 
whole” criteria to determine if a certain service falls within the scope of the 
exemption or not.  
 
In 2007 the ECJ delivered its judgment in the case Velvet & Steel 
Immobilien, which concerned the interpretation of article 135(1)(c) in the 
VAT directive. Important to note is that this case was referred to the ECJ the 
same year as the case Volker Ludwig in which the ECJ delivered its 
judgment a few months later. The question in the case concerned an 
assumption of an obligation to renovate a building in return for a part of the 
purchase price of the building and if this kind of assumption of obligation 
falls within the scope of article 135(1)(c).  
 
In its judgment, the ECJ began by stating that exemptions as a general rule 
must be interpreted strictly and that they are independent concepts of EU 
law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the VAT system.147 Since the 
directive does not provide for a definition of the concept of assumption of 
obligations the ECJ examined the different language versions of article 
135(1)(c). The ECJ concluded that in some language versions the concept of 
assumption of obligation had a general meaning while other versions, such 
as the English and Spanish, limited the concept to only pecuniary 
obligations. In view of the language differences, the concept cannot be 
interpreted on a literal basis but has to be viewed in light of the context in 
which it is used and with regard to the aims and scheme of the VAT 
directive.148 The ECJ then continued by stating that with regard to the 
context of the article 135(1)(c), the paragraph deals with transactions that 
are by their nature financial services and the assumption of an obligation to 
renovate a building cannot be considered a financial transaction by its 
nature. Therefore, it does not come within the scope of the provision in 
question.149 According to the ECJ, this conclusion is also supported by the 
purpose of the exemption for financial transactions, which is to alleviate the 
difficulties connected with determining the tax base and to avoid an increase 
in the cost of consumer credit. Since the obligation to renovate a building 
does not provide for such difficulties, the transaction cannot be exempted.150  
                                                
147 Judgment in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C-455/05, EU:C:2007:232, para. 14-15. 
148 Judgment in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C-455/05, EU:C:2007:232, para. 20. 
149 Judgment in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C-455/05, EU:C:2007:232, para. 23. 
150 Judgment in Velvet & Steel Immobilien, C-455/05, EU:C:2007:232, para. 24. Worth 
mentioning is that the statement regarding the purpose of the exemptions have also been 
criticized, see for ex. Confédération Fiscale Européenne, Opinion Statement of the CFE on 
the Velvet & Steel Case (C-455/05) 50 Eur. Taxn. 4 (2010). However, the ECJ has 
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A similar reliance on the interpretational methods when interpreting the 
exemptions can be found elsewhere in the case law. In the case MKG 
Factoring the ECJ was asked to interpret the concept of debt collection in 
article 135(1)(d). The question posed to the ECJ was if the activity of true 
factoring could also be considered as debt collection within the meaning of 
paragraph (d) in article 135(1). The ECJ observed that only the English and 
Swedish language versions had specifically excluded factoring from the 
exemption in paragraph (d) while other versions only mentioned the 
exclusion of debt collection in general.151 Nevertheless, the wording in those 
language versions did not preclude the concept of factoring to be included in 
debt collection.152 The ECJ reached this conclusion by examining the 
context and spirit of article 135(1)(d) in relation to the scheme of the 
directive.153 The essential aim of the debt collection is to recover debts owed 
to a third party. In that sense, factoring therefore constitutes a more general 
concept of the debt collection thus falling within the scope of paragraph 
(d).154   
 
In view of these cases, the ECJ did not make any reference to the distinct 
whole criteria it had applied in its previous case law. The interpretation of 
the ECJ departed from the traditional methods of interpretation when 
interpreting EU provisions. Yet in the case Volker Ludwig and later cases, 
the distinct whole criteria appeared once again.155 Notably, the ECJ itself 
pointed out that the legal certainty is aimed to be achieved regarding the 
exemptions and therefore the exemptions must be interpreted in a uniform 
way.156  
 
4.3.4 Strict or extensive interpretation 
When dealing with the interpretation of exemptions the ECJ has consistently 
held that the exemptions constitutes derogations from the general principle 
of VAT and must therefore be interpreted strictly. This strict interpretation 
could be perceived as somewhat nuanced when looking at the case law. The 
strict interpretation does not necessarily suggest for an entirely restrictive 
interpretational approach. AG Jacobs stated in his opinion in the case 
Zoological Society that a strict interpretation of VAT exemptions does not 
                                                                                                                        
maintained its position regarding the purpose, see for ex. Judgments in Tiercé Ladbroke, C-
231/07, EU:C:2008:275, para. 24 and Granton Advertising, C-461/12, EU:C:2014:1745, 
para. 30. 
151 Judgment in MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377, para. 68. 
152 Judgment in MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377, para. 79. 
153 Judgment in MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377, para. 70. 
154 Judgment in MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377, para. 77. The interpretational 
approach was later confirmed by the ECJ in the case Axa UK, C-175/09, EU:C:2010:646 
which also dealt with interpreting the term debt collection in article 135(1)(d).  
155 See section 4.3.2.  
156 Judgment in MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377, para. 64. 
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necessarily mean restrictive. VAT exemptions should apply to which it is 
intended to and not more.157  
 
Looking at the area of financial service exemptions the ECJ has, in some of 
the cases, adopted an extensive view when interpreting these exemptions. In 
GfBk, the ECJ interpreted the concept of exempt management services as 
also including advisory services despite the fact these services did not alter 
the funds legal or financial position nor were listed in annex II in the UCITS 
directive listing exempt management activities.158  
 
Furthermore, the ECJ provided another extension basis in Volker Ludwig by 
stating that activities deemed to be ancillary to the principal exempt activity 
would also be deemed exempt.159 This widening statement diverge from the 
interpretation of the exemption made by the ECJ in CSC.  
 
The role of the principle of fiscal neutrality as a method of interpretation is a 
significant reason for this extensive interpretation. The interpretation of 
paragraph (g) in article 135(1) provides for several examples of that. In the 
case Abbey National the ECJ stated that article 135(1)(g) does not define a 
special investment fund and that this exemption applies to all undertakings 
that deals with collective investments. The ECJ emphasized that the 
principle of fiscal neutrality prevents unequal treatment for VAT purposes 
of taxable persons in the same situation. In the case JP Morgan the ECJ 
stated that an exclusion of close-ended investment funds as being regarded 
as special investment funds would be contrary to the principle of fiscal 
neutrality when compared to open-ended investment funds that were 
covered by the exemption.160 Therefore, the ECJ extended the scope to also 
include close-ended investment funds. In addition, the principle of fiscal 
neutrality was also used by the ECJ to extend the scope of special 
investment funds to include also pension funds.161   
 
In the case SEB, the ECJ interpreted article 135(1)(f) as including 
underwriting guarantees regardless of if the shares has been fully or partially 
subscribed. To make such an exemption conditional on whether the shares 
has been fully or partially subscribed would be contrary to the principle of 
fiscal neutrality.162 Furthermore, with reference to the principle of fiscal 
neutrality, the ECJ also interpreted the exemption of a credit granted by a 
non- financial institution as being exempt. Otherwise, by not extending the 
exemption to a non-financial institution granting the same credit referred to 
in article 135(1)(b) the VAT treatment of persons performing the same 
activities would be different.163  
 
                                                
157 AG opinion in Zoological Society, C-267/00, EU:C:2001:698, para.19.  
158 Judgment in GfBk, C-275/11, EU:C:2013:141, para. 25-26. 
159 Judgment in Volker Ludwig, C-453/05, EU:C:2007:369, para. 17-20. 
160 Judgment in JP Morgan, C-363/05, EU:C:2007:391, para. 29. 
161 See for ex. Judgment in Wheels, C-424/11, EU:C:2013:144, para. 21 and also judgment 
in ATP Pension Service, C-464/12, EU:C:2014:139, para. 44. 
162 Judgment in SEB, C-540/09, EU:C:2011:137, para. 36. 
163 Judgment in Muys’ en de Winter, C-281/91, EU:C:1993:855, para. 13-14. 
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This extensive approach does not seem to be unique to the area of financial 
service. On the contrary, the ECJ seems to have adopted a more extensive 
approach when interpreting VAT exemptions in general.164 With reference 
to the opinion of AG Jacobs in the case Zoological society, AG Colomer 
stated the same view in his opinion in the case Temco Europe.165 His 
opinion was subsequently followed by the ECJ.166 In addition, the ECJ has 
stated that this strict interpretation must not deprive the exemptions of their 
intended effect, which does not suggest for a restrictive approach.167 The 
interpretation of the exemptions must be consistent with the objectives they 
pursue and need to comply with the principle of fiscal neutrality.168  
 
                                                
164 See for ex. Judgment in Canterbury Hockey, C-253/07, EU:C:2008:571. 
165 AG opinion in Temco Europe, C-284/03, EU:C:2004:287, para. 37. 
166 Judgment in Temco Europe, C-284/03, EU:C:2004:730. 
167 See for example judgment in Axa UK, C-175/09, EU:C:2010:646, para. 25. See also the 
judgment in MKG Factoring EU:C:2003:377, para. 71. 
168 Judgment in SEB, C-540/09, EU:C:2011:137, para. 20. 
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5 Financial service exemption 
in the Swedish VAT Act 
5.1 Historical background 
In 1991, the Swedish tax system was profoundly reformed with regard to 
both the direct and indirect tax area. Before 1991, financial services were 
considered not to be taxable services and were not included in the scope of 
the VAT provisions. In 1991, the scope of VAT was extended to include all 
goods and services that were not specifically exempt from taxation. In the 
process leading to the reform of the VAT provisions, it was considered to be 
more correct to tax financial services due to the cascading effect of the VAT 
and the distortions in competition.169 However, Sweden was hesitant to tax 
financial services in fear of having a legislation that was not compatible 
with EU law.170 A study was conducted in order to ascertain the 
international consequences of taxing financial services. However, the study 
was not followed in the bill to the VAT Act, which proposed that financial 
services should be exempt from VAT.171   
 
Furthermore, the study did not result in a proposal that financial services 
should be subject to VAT.172 The reason for this was the difficulties that 
will arise when taxing financial services. The report observed for example 
that a tax on financial services would be hard to achieve due to the difficulty 
of determining a taxable amount on the financial service. In addition, since 
the Sixth directive exempted financial activities from VAT and that the 
purpose of the Sixth directive was to achieve harmonisation of the VAT 
rules throughout the community, this strongly suggests that financial 
services should remain VAT exempt.173 It is interesting to note however, 
that even though the investigation did not result in the financial services 
being subject to VAT it was proposed that the services should be subject to 
a separate tax only targeting financial services.174 This however, did not 
result in a concrete proposal. Instead, Sweden adopted a revised VAT act 
with an exemption for financial services stated in chapter 8 paragraph 3 of 
the Act and as will be further examined below, this provision has not gone 
through any profound change due to the accession of Sweden into the EU.   
                                                
169 SOU 1989:35, part I, p. 192. 
170 SOU 1989:35, part I, p. 193. 
171 Proposition 1989/90:111, p. 104. 
172 SOU 1990:46 
173 SOU 1990:46, p. 181. 
174 SOU 1990:46, p. 17. Worth mentioning is that Sweden has launched another study into 
this separate tax on financial services, Government Directive 2015:51.  
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5.2 Incorporation of article 135(1)(b)-(g) 
As has been examined above, the obligation for the Member states to 
implement the provisions of a directive into their national law is stated in 
article 288 of the TFEU. With regard to the VAT directive, Sweden has 
dealt with this obligation through the provisions in the current Swedish 
VAT Act.175 Due to the accession into the EU, Sweden was required to 
adjust its national VAT provisions in order to achieve a more harmonized 
structure. The result of this adjustment led to the adoption of the current 
Act.176 The VAT Act is modelled after the VAT directive and the structure 
of the provisions in the act does somewhat resemble the structure in the 
directive.177 However, there are some deviations. The exemption for 
financial services is stated in chapter 3 paragraph 9 in the VAT act and has 
the following wording: 
 
“Supplies of banking and financial services and transactions involving 
securities and comparable activities are exempt from taxation.  
 
Banking and financial services shall not include notarial activity, collection 
of invoices or administrative services relating to factoring or the leasing of 
storage facilities. 
 
Transactions in securities shall mean: 
1. trading and brokerage of shares, other equities and debts, whether 
or not represented by instruments, and 
2. management of investment funds pursuant to Law (2004:46) on 
investment funds and Law (2013:561) on management of alternative 
investment funds.”178 
 
The structure of this provision deviates from the structure of the exemption 
provision in the directive. The directive provision is much more specific in 
terms of exempt transactions. Instead, the Swedish provision is structured as 
a general exemption for financial services and only provides a few examples 
of the services covered by the exemption.   
 
Looking at the preparatory works to the Swedish VAT act only a slightly 
more specific description of the exemption is found. Banking and financial 
services within the meaning of the provision should be regarded as lending 
and deposit services along with remittance services.179 The provision in 
chapter 3 paragraph 9 was only a technical revision of the provision 
introduced in 1991 and was not intended to provide for a further change in 
the scope of the exemption.180  
                                                
175 Mervärdesskattelagen (SFS 1994:200). 
176 Proposition 1993/94:99. 
177 U. Nilsson (2014), p. 19.  
178 Translation of the ECJ in case SEB, C-540/09, EU:C:2011:137. 
179 Proposition 1989/90:111, p. 193. 
180 Proposition 1993/94:99, p. 153. See also proposition 1994/95:57, p. 96-98, only a 
change regarding the exclusion of factoring from the exemption was implemented.  
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5.3 Consistent interpretation in practice 
As mentioned above, the basis for consistent interpretation is that the 
national provision provides room for interpretation. Before dealing with the 
financial service exemption, it seems appropriate to illustrate the reasoning 
of the HFD regarding the determination of interpretational space.   
 
The HFD delivered a judgment in a case that concerned refund of VAT.181 
In this case consistent interpretation was regarded as not necessary since the 
wording of the provision was not sufficiently unclear that an interpretation 
was required. According to the wording of the provision in the VAT act, 
VAT is to be refunded if the goods or service is supplied to a person 
performing taxed activities outside the EU. The question posed to the court 
was if the refund of VAT also applied when the supply of goods or services 
is made to a private consumer within the EU since they technically do not 
perform taxed activities inside the EU. According to the HFD, the VAT is 
refundable even when a supply is made to a private consumer and that the 
wording of the Swedish provision is sufficiently clear to support such a 
conclusion. 
  
In 2007, the HFD delivered a judgment, in an appeal from the National Tax 
Board. The case concerned the fee paid for the parking and storage of 
boats.182 The provision in the VAT act stated that rental of premises and 
spaces for parking vehicles and parking activities were subject to VAT. 
According to the HFD, this also included the parking and storage of boats. 
The decision was based on the judgment of the ECJ regarding the 
exemption in article 13B(b) in the Sixth directive.183 In that judgment the 
ECJ stated that the exclusion from the exemption in article 13B(b) also 
applies to boats and their storage, both on land and in water.  
 
In its judgment, the HFD stated that the concept of parking and parking 
activities had not been clearly defined in Swedish law. The wording of the 
provision was not sufficiently clear and precise in order to interpret the 
provision different from the interpretation made by the ECJ regarding the 
Sixth directive. Therefore, the HFD stated that there is a need to interpret 
the Swedish provision according to EU law in order to achieve the result of 
the directive and in this case this means the inclusion of boats into the 
provision in question.  
 
It is worth mentioning that two members of the National Tax Board 
contested this decision, stating that the wording of the Swedish provision 
does not provide for room to include boats in the definition and that the 
interpretation made by the HFD is contrary to the legality principle. The fact 
that the ECJ has decided a similar case with regard to the directive is not 
relevant since the principle of direct effect of EU law has not been invoked 
                                                
181 RÅ 1999 not. 245. 
182 RÅ 2007 ref. 13. 
183 See judgment in Marselisborg Lystbådehavn, C-428/02, EU:C:2005:126. 
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in the case in question. However, since the national courts are obliged to 
interpret national law in conformity with EU law, the HFD in this case was 
required to interpret the Swedish concept of parking according to the 
directive. 
 
As can be seen above, an interpretation in conformity with EU law can 
provide for a very extensive interpretation of the national provision. It also 
proves the extent to which the HFD is prepared to interpret national VAT 
provisions even though there is not a complete unity in the matter.  
 
5.4 Financial service exemption as 
interpreted by the HFD 
5.4.1 Interpretational methods in general 
Since the provision and the preparatory works provide for a vague 
description, guidance has to be sought in the case law of the HFD, in order 
to further define the scope of the Swedish exemption provision.    
 
At the outset, it is relevant to note that the interpretation legal provisions in 
the Swedish practice departs from the wording of the provision and the 
preparatory works leading to the adoption of the provision in question. If the 
wording does not provide for any guidance as to how the provision should 
be interpreted, guidance is sought in the preparatory works.184 Given that 
Sweden is a country whose legal order is based on the civil law system, 
preparatory works is of equal importance in order to determine the law as 
the wording of the provision itself.185  However, due to the direct effect and 
the primacy of EU provisions, the ECJ considers the Swedish preparatory 
works to be of little significance when it comes to interpreting Swedish 
provisions that implements EU law.186 The preparatory works only become 
necessary to observe if they advocate for a view that is consistent with EU 
law or when EU law specifically refers to the national provision.187  
 
Furthermore, when interpreting the financial service exemption it has 
occurred that the HFD has tried to apply another interpretational approach. 
For example, by departing from consulting the preparatory works, the court 
instead sought guidance, examined the rules, and interpreted the exemption 
in the general context of the provisions for trade and industry in the Swedish 
legislation.188 However, as will be further examined below, the HFD has not 
continued with that same approach.  
                                                
184 See for example the opinion of the National Tax Board in the judgment RÅ 1995 not. 
393. See also the judgment RÅ 1995 not. 296. 
185 M. Bogdan, Komparativ Rättskunskap (2003), p. 91. 
186 See judgment in Björnekulla, C-371/02, EU:C:2004:275, para. 13. 
187 J. Kellgren (1997), p. 50- 55; U. Bernitz, A. Kjellgren, Europarättens grunder (2014), p. 
195-196. 
188 See RÅ 1996 not. 243. 
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5.4.2 Interpretation of the exemption before the 
accession 
Seeing, as the exemption provision in the VAT Act is new in relation to the 
corresponding provision in the VAT directive there is no great quantity of 
case law in this area before the accession of Sweden into the EU. However, 
the amount of cases that have been decided by the HFD still provides for a 
description of the interpretational approach applied by the HFD regarding 
the exemption. 
 
In a case from 1993, the concept of asset management was subject to ruling 
of the HFD.189 The case concerned a company which managed the assets on 
behalf of a client. The question posed to the HFD was if this management of 
assets was considered to be exempt as “transactions involving securities and 
comparable activities” in chapter 8 paragraph 3 in the VAT Act. The HFD 
held that according to the preparatory works to the provision the exemption 
targets the actual transaction activity and the distribution of ownership of 
the securities. Even though asset management services are performed in 
close relation to the transactions, these services are independent concepts 
and are therefore not exempt under the same provision.     
 
The HFD has further stated that in order to benefit from the exemption in 
chapter 8 paragraph 3, the person performing the exempt service needs to be 
a financial institution.190   
 
This line of reasoning has been consistent. For example, a real estate agent 
was not considered to perform exempt negotiation activities when he 
provided mediation between his clients and the bank granting his clients a 
loan in exchange for 1 percent of the lending amount as a fee. According to 
the HFD, the negotiation service needs to be performed by a financial 
institution in order to be considered exempt and since the real estate agent is 
not considered a financial institution, the negotiation services he performs 
could not be considered to be covered by the exemption.191  
 
5.4.3 Chapter 3 paragraph 9  
From the year 1994, the old VAT Act was replaced with the current act. 
However, the provision concerning financial service exemption remained 
unchanged and the cases that concerned a period before the 1994 and 
reached the HFD after the new VAT Act entered into force, were decided 
based on the provision in the current VAT Act.192  
 
                                                
189 RÅ 1993 not. 71. 
190 See for ex. RÅ 1992 not. 209 and RÅ 1992 not. 210. 
191 RÅ 1994 not. 13. 
192 See for ex. the reasoning of the HFD in RÅ 2003 ref. 72 and RÅ 2004 ref. 100. 
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The case RÅ 2003 ref. 94 concerned the concept of underwriting guarantees 
and the question posed to the HFD was whether the service consisting of 
providing underwriting guarantees could be seen as an ancillary service to 
exempt corporate finance services and therefore also exempt from VAT.193 
The case concerned the transition period between the old VAT Act and the 
new and illustrates that the exemption provision in the old VAT Act was 
interpreted together with the provision in the new VAT Act.  
 
In its judgment, the HFD consequently changed the judgment of the 
Administrative Court of Appeal in which the court of Appeal decided that 
the services were to be exempt. The conclusion of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal was reached in reference to the contextual interpretation of the 
exemption provision made by the HFD in RÅ 1996 not. 243.194 However, 
the HFD started by stating that the exemption provision is constructed 
according to the corresponding exemption provision in the Sixth directive. 
A definition of banking and financial services has not been clearly stated in 
the preparatory works but should be interpreted according to the directive. 
The HFD observed that even though the service of underwriting could be 
ancillary to a corporate finance service, the underwriting could also be 
provided as a separate service. In the case in question the underwriting 
guarantee was the sole service provided and unlike the Administrative Court 
and the Administrative Court of Appeal the HFD decided to deal with it as a 
separate service. Moreover, according to the judgment in CSC the services 
that benefits from the exemption needs to be able to alter or extinguish 
parties rights. An underwriting guarantee does not fulfil this requirement 
and can therefore not be exempt according to the exemption provision.        
 
In 2003, the HFD delivered a couple of judgments concerning the financial 
service exemption in VAT Act. One case concerned the asset management 
of investment funds.195 In reference to the ruling in RÅ 1993 not 71, the 
HFD stated that these services are the same kind of management services.196 
Furthermore, the HFD stated that the services provided do not alter or 
extinguish parties’ rights to the assets as has been held by the ECJ in CSC. 
Therefore, these services cannot be considered exempt from VAT. 
 
The question whether certain management services provided to a fund 
trading in securities were exempt from VAT was the subject of another 
ruling from the HFD in 2003.197 First, the HFD held that the VAT Act states 
an exemption for the management of investment funds. According to the 
HFD, this does not apply to close ended funds as in the case in question. 
Second, the HFD stated that the Member states has not been given the 
discretion to define what fund management services are exempt. The 
                                                
193 The HFD stated earlier in RÅ 2001 not. 23 that corporate finance services are covered 
by the exemption in chapter 3 paragraph 9. 
194 See section 5.4.1 above. 
195 RÅ 2003 not. 178. 
196 The HFD also made reference to the case RÅ 1993 not. 71 in its judgment. The same 
line of reasoning was followed in RÅ 1998 not. 248.  
197 RÅ 2003 not. 179. 
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interpretation of the term should therefore be made in conformity with EU 
law. To exempt administrative services as fund management provides for a 
too extensive interpretation of the concept of management in the provision. 
Therefore, VAT exemption was not granted.   
 
In 2005, the HFD delivered its judgment in a case concerning the 
intermediation services provided by a mail-order company (company X).198 
Company X provided certain intermediation services to customers on behalf 
of the company that is supplying the loans and credits (company Y). Some 
of the services provided by X were the administration of loan applications 
and the promotion of the loans supplied by Y to the clients. The question 
posed to the HFD was if the services provided by X are regarded as 
intermediation services exempt from VAT. The HFD considered that the 
outcome of this case is to be decided according to the judgment of the ECJ 
in CSC and considered it unnecessary to refer the case to the ECJ for 
preliminary ruling. Furthermore, in reference to the judgment in CSC, the 
HFD considered the services provided by X as being credit negotiation 
services. According to the HFD, the concept of negotiation entails services 
of allowing two parties to conclude a contract without the benefit of the 
negotiator in mind. The mere performance of administrative services as such 
do not fulfil the concept of negotiation. In addition, the company did not act 
entirely as an intermediary. Therefore, the HFD decided that the services 
performed should not be exempt from VAT. A similar line of reasoning has 
been applied by the HFD in cases regarding mediation services provided by 
a third party between clients and stockbrokers.199          
 
In 2010, the HFD decided another case concerning intermediation.200 The 
case concerned a chain of stores that have entered into an agreement with a 
company supplying credit services. Company X provided administrative 
services to the chain of stores and the question posed to the HFD was if the 
services provided by company X could be considered exempt intermediation 
services. According to the HFD, the company X does not have the status as 
an intermediary since the stores perform the actual intermediation activity. 
The relation between X, the stores and the credit company has not been 
specified as an intermediation relation, in the same sense as in the Volker 
Ludwig case. In addition, the HFD referenced the judgment in Volker 
Ludwig and stated that the services performed by company X do not fulfil 
the specific and essential functions of intermediation and are therefore not 
exempt from VAT. 
 
The influence of Volker Ludwig can also be noted elsewhere in the case law 
of the HFD. The case RÅ 2009 ref. 49 concerned transactions in shares but 
the HFD still considered the Volker Ludwig applicable since there was an 
element of intermediation involved. The case concerned an asset manager 
who supplied client contacts and orders to a bank who trades and manages 
transferable securities. The services performed could essentially be regarded 
                                                
198 RÅ 2005 not. 61. 
199 RÅ 2003 ref. 72 and RÅ 2003 not. 190. 
200 RÅ 2010 ref. 27. 
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as administrative services. For every transaction of securities the bank made 
with the clients, it received a brokerage fee of which the asset manager 
received a percentage. The HFD observed that the actual purpose of the 
agreement between the asset manager and the bank was to make sure the 
bank could conclude the transactions on behalf of the clients. In light of the 
Volker Ludwig, the services provided by the asset manager were therefore 
considered being an intermediation service exempt from VAT. In addition, 
the HFD also stated that it is not necessary to actually participate in the 
transaction of securities in order to benefit from the exemption in chapter 3 
paragraph 9.  
 
As a contrast, the judgment RÅ 2009 ref. 49 deviates from previous rulings 
of the HFD where the HFD has stated that services of negotiation between 
two parties do not alter or extinguish parties rights and are therefore not 
exempt from VAT.201 In these cases, the HFD relied on the judgment in 
CSC in its conclusions. 
 
The indistinct application of the financial service exemption was highlighted 
in a case from 2011.202 The case concerned the concept of underwriting 
guarantees in relation to the buying of shares the Swedish practice. As seen 
in the previous judgment from 2003203, the underwriting guarantee service 
was considered not to be exempt. Both the Administrative Court and the 
Administrative Court of Appeal ruled according to the judgment of 2003 
and considered this situation similar. Therefore, the services were not 
considered exempt. The HFD however, decided to stay the proceedings and 
refer the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
 
In its judgment, the ECJ stated that the services are considered to be exempt 
according to the directive due to the effect of the principle of fiscal 
neutrality.204 Contrary to what the HFD stated in RÅ 2003 ref. 94, the ECJ 
held that the issuing of an underwriting guarantee meets the requirement of 
altering and extinguishing parties rights and obligations laid down in CSC, 
if the guarantee is used. By making the exemptions conditional on whether 
the guarantee is used or not would be contrary to the principle of fiscal 
neutrality. In accordance with the judgment of the ECJ, the HFD stated that 
the interpretation of the directive also applies to the interpretation of the 
VAT Act and therefore the services were considered exempt from VAT.        
 
Furthermore, from an interpretational point of view it is interesting to 
examine the concept of factoring in the Swedish practice since the wording 
of the VAT directive in the Swedish language version has explicitly stated 
factoring alongside the expression of debt collection in article 135(1)(d).205 
                                                
201 See for ex. RÅ 2003 ref. 72, RÅ 2003 not. 189 and RÅ 2003 not. 190. 
202 HFD 2011 ref. 38. 
203 See RÅ 2003 ref. 94 above.  
204 Judgment in SEB, C-540/09, EU:C:2011:137. See also section 4.3.4 above.  
205 It is interesting to note however that the word ”factoring” now has been removed in the 
Swedish language version of the VAT directive. Nevertheless, confirmation of the fact that 
factoring was explicitly stated in the language version can be found, see for ex. judgment in 
MKG Factoring, C-305/01, EU:C:2003:377.  
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In addition, the wording of the VAT Act states that administrative services 
in relation to factoring are not VAT exempt.  
 
In 2012, the HFD delivered a judgment in a case concerning the concept of 
factoring.206 The Swedish tax authorities contested that the consideration 
received from buying debts without the assumption of the risk of loss should 
be VAT exempt. The question arose in the proceeding whether the wording 
of chapter 3 paragraph 9 in the VAT Act was sufficiently clear and whether 
the provision could be interpreted in conformity with EU law. According to 
the wording of the provision only administrative services in relation to 
factoring were excluded from the exemption. However, according to the 
HFD, the provision has been drafted in accordance with the corresponding 
provision in the VAT directive. The concept of factoring is therefore 
included in the expression “collection of invoices” in the Swedish provision. 
In reference to the judgment in MKG Factoring, the HFD then continued by 
stating that this application is consistent with EU law and the fact that 
administrative services are the only services excluded in the wording does 
not preclude such an interpretation. The reason that the wording of the 
provision includes “administrative services in relation to factoring” is only 
to clarify that these services are also not exempted from taxation.207  
  
Worth mentioning is that the case law also features a discussion on whether 
factoring is considered to be a debt collection service or actually a corporate 
finance service exempt from VAT. In the case decided by the 
Administrative Court of Appeal208, the Administrative court argued in its 
judgment that the provision in the VAT Act only excludes administrative 
services from the exemption and that the factoring service itself is 
exempt.209 The preparatory works to the provision support this. The 
intention of the legislator was that the collection of invoices consists of two 
separate services, one taxable administrative service and one exempt 
financial service.210 According to the Administrative court, although the 
term banking and financial services in the VAT Act is vague and needs to 
be interpreted in conformity with EU law, the wording of the provision 
clearly states that only administrative services in relation to factoring is not 
exempt which suggests that factoring itself is exempt. Therefore, an 
interpretation in conformity with EU law is not possible to achieve. The 
result of a consistent interpretation would otherwise be to the disadvantage 
of the person supplying the service. Nevertheless, as seen above, the 
Administrative court of Appeal and the HFD do not share this view and has 
stated that factoring is considered as debt collection in accordance with the 
interpretation of the ECJ regarding the directive.   
 
                                                
206 Judgment by the HFD in case nr. 6291-6293-10. 
207 This same interpretation was made by the HFD in case nr. 753-757-11 and by the 
Administrative Court of Appeal in case nr. 3144-3146-10. 
208 Administrative Court of Appeal, case nr. 3144-3146-10. 
209 Administrative court, case nr. 10201-10203-10. 
210 SOU 1994:88, p. 126.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter summarises and elaborates on the analysis and conclusions 
made in the previous chapters. 
  
6.1 EU law 
It is settled case law that VAT exemptions constitute derogations from the 
general principle of VAT and should therefore be interpreted strictly. It is 
also settled case law that the ECJ has not been inclined to interpret the 
financial service exemption according to that principle. On the contrary, the 
interpretation of the exemption has been quite extensive. This is mainly due 
to the effect of the principle of fiscal neutrality. It can be argued whether 
this interpretation contributes to the increase of legal certainty regarding the 
exemption or not.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of the distinct whole criteria by the ECJ is 
another factor that provides for uncertainty regarding the interpretation of 
the exemption. When introduced, the ECJ did not motivate this introduction 
in any way nor explained the lack of references to the methods of 
interpretation. In addition, the “distinct whole” criteria is used frequently by 
the ECJ but not entirely consistent. In some cases the ECJ has made no 
reference to the criteria whatsoever. In the earlier cases dealing with the 
financial service exemption, ranging from the case SDC to the case Abbey 
National the distinct whole criteria has been a reoccurring feature of the 
interpretation in these cases. In the cases without reference to the criteria, 
the ECJ has confined in the traditional interpretational methods when 
interpreting EU law in order to interpret the scope of the provision. In MKG 
and Velvet & Steel the ECJ has not referenced the “distinct whole” criteria at 
all and instead interpreted the exemption with the usage of the traditional 
interpretational methods. Thus, the case law in this area shows a lack of 
consistency regarding the interpretational approach of article 135(1)(b)-(g) 
applied by the ECJ. 
 
However, it is through the case law of the ECJ that the financial service 
exemption has been developed and the inconsistencies of the ECJ when 
interpreting the provision has not provided for increased legal certainty in 
this regard. Moreover, with regard to the impact of the principle of fiscal 
neutrality on the scope of the exemption, one can ask if the principle 
actually is compatible with the principle of strict interpretation of VAT 
exemptions. 
 
Finally, the exemption for financial services has not been clearly motivated 
in the preparatory acts leading up to the adoption of the Sixth directive. The 
purpose of exempting financial services from VAT was not specified until 
the ECJ delivered its judgment in Velvet& Steel. Although this purpose has 
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been criticized to some extent the ECJ has since maintained this approach 
throughout its judgments. On the basis of that decision the ECJ started to 
build a proper base for exempting financial services by actually making 
reference to the purpose they aim to achieve. The Member states has 
therefore been given a consistent basis of the financial service exemption on 
which national law can be interpreted in accordance with. Although, it is 
very fragile. 
 
6.2 Swedish law  
The exemption provision in the Swedish VAT Act did not change in a 
significant manner due to the Swedish accession, which essentially means 
that the interpretation of HFD before and after the accession departs from 
the same wording. Therefore it becomes interesting to note that the 
conclusions reached by the HFD in the cases before the accession are 
different from those reached by ECJ in Muy’s en de Winter and SDC 
concerning the directive. This supports the conclusion that even though the 
Sixth directive influenced the VAT Act, the interpretation and application of 
the VAT Act by the HFD is different from the result according to the VAT 
directive. 
 
It is clear that the interpretation and developments of the financial service 
exemption in the VAT directive has influenced the interpretation and 
application of the Swedish provision. Looking at the case law of the HFD 
before the accession into the EU, the financial service exemption has been 
given a restrictive interpretation and the HFD has been unwilling to extend 
the scope of the exemption. The most significant example is the fact that the 
HFD considered the financial service exemption applicable only to the 
services performed by financial institutions. As seen from further case law, 
the HFD has changed this opinion due to a clear statement in that regard 
made by the ECJ in SDC and in latter cases.  
 
Furthermore, the Swedish financial service exemption has not been given an 
autonomous meaning in the VAT Act, in comparison to the corresponding 
exemption in the directive. The HFD has made little effort to define the 
exemption and instead departed from the strict meaning of the wording. 
After the accession, the HFD has relied on the definition and interpretation 
of the ECJ regarding the directive and has looked at the outcome of 
individual cases decided by the ECJ in order to define the exemption.211   
 
Consequently, the reliance on the ECJ provides for the inconsistencies of 
the ECJ to manifest in the judgments of the HFD. A good example is the 
case RÅ 2005 not. 61, in which, the HFD relied on the judgment of the ECJ 
                                                
211 See for example RÅ 2001 ref. 23, RÅ 2003 ref. 72, RÅ 2004 ref. 100, RÅ 2009 ref. 49, 
HFD 2014 ref. 73. Although some examples can be found where the HFD has tried to 
define the financial service exemption in the VAT act, see section 5.4.1 above.   
  
 48 
in the case CSC. However, as the case RÅ 2010 ref. 27 shows, the reliance 
on Volker Ludwig provides for a different interpretational outcome. 
Although the HFD did consider the services performed in both cases as not 
exempt, the reason for not exempting the services in RÅ 2010 ref. 27 was 
the lack of an intermediary relationship and that the person seeking the 
exemption did not perform the intermediation activity. However, the 
outcome of the case RÅ 2005 not. 61 would likely be very different if we 
apply the reasoning of the HFD in RÅ 2010 ref. 27 to it instead.    
 
Overall, it is perhaps the uncertainty of the financial service exemption on 
EU level and the fear of having a legislation that is incompatible with EU 
that has provided for such a restrictive approach from the HFD and such 
extensive reliance on the judgments of the ECJ. The interpretation and the 
application of the exemption have been developed in the case law of the 
ECJ instead of in the legislation. The task of clarifying the uncertainty that 
exists regarding the exemption has therefore been left to the interpretation of 
the ECJ. As the ECJ has provided a more extensive interpretation of the 
exemption, the HFD has changed its restrictive stance accordingly. Thus, it 
becomes clear that the interpretation of the HFD has changed to a much 
more extensive approach due to the interpretation of the ECJ.          
 
6.3 The consistent interpretation     
As seen above, the whole purpose of consistent interpretation is to give 
effect to EU law in the application of national legislation. In case of 
financial services, the question that needs to be answered is, if EU law 
provides for a clear and consistent base in order to give the national courts a 
chance to put EU law in effect. The legal uncertainty that exists on EU level 
in this area provides difficulties for the national courts to follow, at least 
when looking at how the ECJ judgments has effected the interpretation of 
the HFD. However, the case law of the ECJ seem to have reached the point 
where some consistency can be established for the national courts to rely on.  
 
With regard to the consistent interpretation itself, the key in this issue lies 
within the question if the national provision provides room for 
interpretation. Seeing as the Swedish VAT Act is structured according to the 
directive it is quite remarkable that the wording of the exemption provision 
provides such a general wording and deviates to such extent from the 
wording in the directive. Consequently, a general wording provides for 
greater room to interpret a provision, which leaves a lot of responsibility to 
the national court to make sure the law is interpreted in conformity with EU 
law. 
 
In this instance, the HFD has relied on the case law of the ECJ in order to 
interpret the provision in the VAT Act. According to the judgment of ECJ in 
Pfeiffer, the basis of a consistent interpretation is the result of the provision 
according to national methods of interpretation. However, in a harmonized 
area such as the area of VAT, the purposes of the EU acts, in this case the 
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VAT directive should in principle be underlying the national provisions 
implementing said directive. Due to the primacy of EU law, the Swedish 
method of interpreting law by examining the preparatory works is not 
actually used. A consistent interpretation therefore becomes the 
interpretation of the national provisions according to the principles and 
methods sought to interpret the directive. In essence, this means that the 
national court needs to interpret EU law in order to achieve a truly 
consistent interpretation regarding the VAT provisions. By examining EU 
law, the national court can determine if the result of the application 
prescribed in EU law fits the result of the application of national law, in this 
case chapter 3 paragraph 9 in the VAT Act.  
 
The case law of the HFD shows that when dealing with the financial service 
exemption, the interpretation of the HFD has its substantial starting point in 
EU law, which establishes a consistent interpretation made by the HFD. 
However, the perception demonstrated in the preparatory works to the 
financial service exemption, that the provision is entirely compatible with 
EU law should perhaps be reviewed. It is clear that when relying on the 
wording of the Swedish provision alone and without any guiding judgments 
by the ECJ it is not certain whether the HFD would reach the same 
conclusions as the ECJ. In the case from 2003 regarding fund management 
services, the HFD did observe the need to interpret the concept of 
management in conformity with EU law but that it could rely on the 
Swedish provision in this regard.212 The HFD decided the case without 
referring it to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. However, a few years later 
the ECJ delivered the judgment in Abbey National, concerning the same 
type of management services provided in the case before the HFD earlier. It 
was stated in that judgment that administrative services relating to fund 
management are to be considered exempt within the meaning of the 
directive. This judgment showed that the interpretation of the HFD was not 
in accordance with the directive. Thus, the ruling of the HFD in the RÅ 
2003 not 179 no longer becomes valid law since there is a ruling from the 
ECJ in this matter that contradicts it. 
 
Moreover, in the judgment HFD 2011 ref. 38, the HFD stated that the 
treatment of underwriting guarantees in the directive also applies to the 
treatment of the same guarantees according to the VAT Act. This despite the 
fact that the HFD in the previous ruling RÅ 2003 ref. 94, stated that the 
service of providing underwriting guarantees is not exempt under the 
Swedish provision. It is obvious that the HFD in the judgment HFD 2011 
ref. 38 overrules the judgment delivered in RÅ 2003 ref. 94 after consulting 
the ECJ. 
 
In addition, the HFD has even used the definitions of the ECJ regarding the 
directive in order to establish the law according to the Swedish provision. 
The judgments of the HFD concerning factoring exemplifies this. The 
combination of the statements in the preparatory works concerning factoring 
                                                
212 RÅ 2003 not. 179. The case has been presented above.  
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and the fact that the expression “factoring” has been removed from the 
Swedish language version of the VAT directive, could perhaps suggest a 
different view on factoring. From a Swedish point of view, factoring is 
perhaps not intended to be a debt collection service entirely. This advocates 
somewhat for the opinion of the Administrative court in this regard and that 
factoring actually is an exempt financial service.    
 
Seeing as the HFD strives to interpret the Swedish provision according to 
the directive, it is noteworthy that not more cases are referred to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling. The cases RÅ 2003 ref. 94 and RÅ 2011 ref. 38 are 
only one example of the difference between the view of the HFD and the 
view of the ECJ about how EU law is interpreted and applied. In addition, 
had the HFD referred the case RÅ 2003 not. 179 to the ECJ as well, it 
would most likely have resulted in a different outcome.  
 
It becomes clear that consistent interpretation is able to provide an extensive 
interpretation of the national provision, as seen in the case RÅ 2007 ref. 13. 
Moreover, it is clear from the discussion above that the HFD has not 
deviated from the interpretation of the ECJ when interpreting the financial 
service exemption.  
 
However, as seen above, the consistent interpretation is still subject to the 
fundamental principles stated in the EU treaties, such as the principle of 
legal certainty. The national court cannot interpret national provisions 
against these principles, i.e contra legem. Nevertheless, the degree of EU 
harmonization plays an important role when determining the limitations of 
the consistent interpretation. In the area of VAT, national provisions are to 
their entirety based on the sources of EU law. Seeing as the financial service 
exemption has been developed by the ECJ, the main source therefore 
becomes the case law. Thus, the consistent interpretation is not limited for 
the national courts, as long as the interpretation of the ECJ does not infringe 
the general principles of EU law.  
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